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REPURCHASE AGREEMENT TRANSACTIONS
IN SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION ACT
PROCEEDINGS
I.

Introduction

One of the primary duties of a bankruptcy' trustee2 is to maximize the estate3 of a bankrupt." In order to accomplish that
goal, the trustee is vested with the power to control assets in which
the bankrupt has a legal or equitable interest.' For example, because
the bankrupt retains an equitable interest in assets pledged as collateral for a loan, 6 a bankruptcy trustee can prevent creditors from
1. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 321-31 (1982).
2. This Note discusses two types of trustees who exercise powers under the
two different Acts: bankruptcy trustees whose powers are expressly defined in the
Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 321-331 (1982); and SIPA trustees, whose
powers are delineated by the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA). See 15
U.S.C. § 78fff-1 (1982). SIPA gives a SIPA trustee the powers of a bankruptcy
trustee that are consistent with SIPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-l(b) (1982).
3. The Bankruptcy Code provides that when a bankruptcy case is commenced
under §§ 301, 302 or 303, an estate is created. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982). That
estate consists of all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property, with
some exceptions. See id. The "debtor" is a "person . . . concerning whom a case has
been commenced" under the Bankruptcy Code. See id. § 101(12) (1982). To avoid
confusion when speaking about debt transactions, this Note uses the term "bankrupt" rather than "debtor" when speaking about a person liquidated by the
Bankruptcy Code. Congress declined to use "bankrupt" in the Bankruptcy Code
because of its negative connotations. See H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
310 (1977). This Note also uses the term "insolvent broker" when speaking about
a broker liquidated under SIPA.
4. In re Gustav Schaefer Co., 103 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1939); In re Kessler, 186
F. 127 (2d Cir. 1911), aff'd, 228 U.S. 634 (1913); 4 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY
704.01 (15th ed. 1986) [hereinafter COLLIER].
5. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (1982). Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code gives
bankruptcy trustees the power to use or sell property of the estate. Id. Section
541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the estate of the bankrupt includes
"all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement
of the case" 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982); see also 4 COLLIER, supra note 4,
541.01, at 541-5. A bankruptcy case is commenced when a voluntary, joint or
involuntary petition is filed with the bankruptcy court. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-303
(1982).
6. 4 COLLIER, supra note 4,
541.08[3], at 548-46.1. A debtor can give a
creditor two types of collateral: he can pledge property, see id. 541.0819], or he
can encumber his property by giving a creditor a security interest. See id. 541.08[3].
If a debtor pledges collateral, the creditor receives a possessory interest rather than
an ownership interest in the property. See id. 541.0819]. Accordingly, if a creditor
files for bankruptcy while holding pledged collateral, that pledged collateral is not
considered part of his estate in bankruptcy. See id.
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foreclosing on collateral.7 In contrast, if the bankrupt sold the assets,

transferring ownership rights to the buyer,' the bankruptcy trustee
must allow the new owner of the property to dispose of it at will. 9
These distinctions have forced bankruptcy courts to classify complex transactions as either sales or loans.' 0 Courts have found it
difficult to make this determination when dealing with financial
instruments called repurchase agreements (REPOs)." REPOs are

executed in two steps. First, the REPO issuer sells securities to the
REPO buyer. The REPO buyer pays for the securities and agrees
to sell the securities back to the REPO issuer at a later date. Second,
at the later date, the REPO buyer returns the securities and the

In contrast, if a creditor retains a security interest in collateral, the Bankruptcy
Code states that collateral is included in a creditor's estate in bankruptcy. See id.
541.08[3], at 541-46.2. For the purposes of this Note, collateral is presumed to
be held subject to a security interest, and is, therefore, included in a debtor's estate
when the bankruptcy case is commenced. But see In re Financial Corp., 1 Bankr.
522, 526 n.7 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (repurchase agreement (REPO) is a pledge, and
does not create a security interest).
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982) ("a petition filed under section 301, 302 or
303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as a stay, applicable to all entities");
4 COLLIER, supra note 4, 541.01, at 541-6 (trustee has many powers that spring
from court's determination that property in dispute is property of bankrupt's estate);
see also infra notes 139-41.
8. Brown describes the transfer of ownership rights, or title, as the point at
which the risk of loss moves fron the seller to the buyer. R. BROWN, THE LAW
OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 191 (3d ed. 1975). Yet, under the Uniform Commercial

Code (U.C.C.), the passage of title is irrelevant in determining when ownership
changes. See U.C.C. § 1-201 official comment 1 (1978). Instead, the U.C.C. works
to assure that an ownership interest in a security becomes irrevocable when a
security has been transferred in a way that gives all the world notice of the change
in ownership. See U.C.C. § 8-321 official comment 1-2 (1978).
9. A person who holds unencumbered title to property can dispose of it at
will, unless the bankruptcy trustee can avoid the transfer that created the property
interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1982); 4 COLLIER, supra note 4, 548.07, at 541-67.
See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the SIPA trustee's
avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A SIPA trustee, however, cannot
avoid the transfer if someone perfects his interest according to the applicable provisions of the U.C.C. of the state in which the property is located. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 546 (1982); U.C.C. § 9-321(2) (1978).
10. See Note, Repurchase Agreements and the Bankruptcy Code: The Need for
Legislative Action, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 828, 832 (1984) [hereinafter Need for
Legislative Action]; Mitchell, Banking: Repurchase Agreements, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26,
1983, at 6, col. I [hereinafter Mitchell]; Portnoy, Lombard-Wall Proceeding to
Address Repos Issue, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1982, at 19, col. 1 [hereinafter Portnoy].
11. See, e.g., In re E.S.M. Gov't Sec., Inc., 52 Bankr. 372, 375 (S.D. Fla.
1985) (court received exhaustive memoranda and spent considerable time researching
sale/loan issue). For an explanation of repurchase agreements, see infra notes 11,
52-62 and accompanying text.
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REPO issuer pays slightly more cash than he had received in the
2
first step.1
In the time between the first portion of a REPO transaction the
sale) and the second portion (the repurchase) the securities involved
display some characteristics of loan collateral and some characteristics
of sold items. 3 If a REPO participant became insolvent during that
period, the structure of the Bankruptcy Code forced a bankruptcy
court to choose one of the two characterizations-sale or loan.'
Because the courts reached different conclusions on the issue, the
participants in the REPO transaction were unsure which characterization a court would adopt. 5 The characterization was crucial 6
because the Bankruptcy Code treats collateral 17 differently than it
8
treats sold items.'
Finally, in 1984, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to resolve
this uncertainty. 19 Congress prescribed specific, technical rules for

12. See First Nat'l Bank v. Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d 668, 669 n.2 (5th Cir.
1981); Cosmopolitan Credit & Inv. Corp. v. Blyth Eastman, 507 F. Supp. 954,
956 (S.D. Fla. 1981); SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In
re Financial Corp., 1 Bankr. 522, 524 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
13. Courts have recognized that "REPO" transactions are similar to loans, see
infra notes 66-78, and commented that they should be treated as such. See, e.g.,
In re Legel, Braswell Gov't Sec. Corp., 648 F.2d 321, 324 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981);
SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Other courts, however,
have classified REPOs as sales. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Las Vegas v. Estate
of Russell, 657 F.2d 668, 676 (5th Cir. 1981); Gilmore v. State Bd. of Admin.,
382 So. 2d 861, 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); see also infra notes 79-88.
14. See Letter from Thomas A. Russo to Congressman Benjamin Rosenthal,
reprinted in Am. Banker, Aug. 13, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
15. See Need for Legislative Action, supra note 10, at 831 n.19; see also Mitchell,
supra note 10, at 6, cols. 1-2 (courts split on sale/loan question); Portnoy, supra
note 10, at 25, col. 2 (REPOs have been treated equivocally by the courts); Quint,
Lombard and Iowa Rulings Spark Review of REPO Agreements, L.A. Daily J.,
Oct. 1, 1982, at 3, col. 1 (securities dealers hoping decision classifying REPOs as
loans would not be relied upon as precedent) [hereinafter Quint].
16. See Portnoy, supra note 10, at 25, col. 2; see also Mitchell, supra note 10,
at 6, col. 1.
17. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(a), -(c)(2) (1982).
18. When property has been unconditionally sold by the bankrupt for value
and in good faith, the trustee cannot recover the property. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(c)
(1982). In addition, the powers of a bankruptcy trustee are subject to any generally
applicable law that gives a property holder with a perfected interest in property
rights against all others. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (1982).
19. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333. For commentary on the effect of the 1984 amendments
to the Bankruptcy Code, see Cooper, Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 57 N.Y. ST. B.J. 29 (May 1985) [hereinafter Cooper]; Schwarcz,
Repurchase Agreements and Bankruptcy Changes, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 10, 1984, at
18, col. 3 [hereinafter Schwarcz].
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courts to follow when they encountered REPO transactions in a
bankruptcy proceeding. 20 A problem remains, however, because a
2
significant number of insolvent REPO participants are stockbrokers. '
Courts liquidate the holdings of stockbrokers2 2 under the Securities
Investor Protection Act (SIPA).23 SIPA is an independent act that
incorporates only those provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that are
consistent with SIPA's aims. 2 4 Congress designed SIPA to settle
claims without requiring a SIPA trustee to liquidate securities 25 and
to afford one class of creditors-customers-preference over all other
creditors. 26 In contrast, the Bankruptcy Code attempts to insure that
REPOs can be liquidated 27 and prevents a SIPA trustee from recovering securities underlying a REPO transaction to satisfy the claims
20. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
21. See Exchange Act Release No. 18418 (Jan. 13, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg.
3521, 3527 n.14 (Jan. 25, 1982). As of 1979, REPOs accounted for 32% of
aggregate assets and 32.6% of aggregate liabilities of reporting broker-dealers. See
id. REPOs represented the largest single asset and the largest single liability of
broker dealers. See id; see also Request for Comments on the Oversight of the
U.S. Government and Agency Securities Markets, Exchange Act Release No.
83,760 (Apr. 9,
21959 [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1985) (unregistered dealers in 1.5 trillion dollar per month government securities
market leverage their holdings using REPO transactions) [hereinafter Oversight of
Government Securities]; Molinam & Kibler, Broker-Dealer'sFinancialResponsibility
Under the Uniform Net Capital Rule-A Case for Liquidity, 72 GEO. L.J. 1, 27
(1983).
22. There is a distinction between a "broker" who acts as an agent of a
customer and a "dealer" who performs a service for the customer. Compare 15
U.S.C. § 78c(4) (1982) (Exchange Act definition of "broker") with 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(5) (1982) (Exchange Act definition of "dealer"). See also Douglas & Bates,
Stock "Brokers" as Agents and Dealers, 43 YALE L.J. 46, 46 (1933); Note, The
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970: A New Federal Role in Investor Protection, 24 VAND. L. REV. 586 n.2 (1984). This Note will use the term "broker"
as a short form of the word "stockbroker." Thus, for the purposes of this Note,
a broker can act either as an agent of a customer or for his own account.
23. See Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78aaa-78111 (1982)).
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b) (1982).
25. See Securities Investor Protection Act Amendments: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Senate Hearings]; S. REP.
No. 763, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 764, 765 [hereinafter 1978 SENATE REPORT]; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78fffl(b)(1) (1982) (trustee has duty to avoid liquidating securities); 4 COLLIER, supra
750.1, at 750-2 (SIPA distinguished from Bankruptcy Code by SIPA
note 4,
policy of avoiding necessity of liquidating securities).
26. See SIPC v. Executive Sec. Corp., 423 F. Supp. 94, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
aff'd, 556 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Kenneth Bove & Co., 378 F. Supp.
697, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
750.01,
27. See 11 U.S.C. § 559 (Supp. III 1985); 4 COLLIER, supra note 4,
at 750-52.
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of customers.2" Since the bankruptcy provisions are inconsistent with
SIPA, they do not apply to SIPA proceedings.2 9 Therefore the

sale/loan problem remains. SIPA forces courts once again to determine how to characterize securities underlying a REPO transaction.3"
In each SIPA proceeding, a SIPA trustee3" has a duty to return

securities to an insolvent 2 broker's" customers34 and to reimburse
those customers for any securities he fails to return." Until he depletes
them, the SIPA trustee uses the cash and securities that the bankrupt
broker set aside for customers.3" He then uses the assets of the

28. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(f) (Supp. III 1986). SIPA prevents a trustee from
avoiding a margin or settlement payment in a REPO transaction. See id. SIPA
also prohibits a SIPA trustee from preventing a REPO participant from setting
off a mutual debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(7) (1982).
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b) (1982) (Bankruptcy Code only applicable "to the
extent consistent with [SIPA]"); see also Marans & Prezioso, Current Status of
REPO Close-outs in Agency Supervised Liquidations, in REPURCHASE AND REVERSE
REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS

255 (P.L.I. 1985).

30. See In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp., [Current
Vol.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,966, at 94723 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 1986); In re
E.S.M. Gov. Sec., Inc., 52 Bankr. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1985); see also REPO Participants
Not Customers in E.S.M. Collapse, SIPC Tells Court, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 23, at 1003-04 (June 7, 1985) [hereinafter REPO Participants Not Customers];
Levin & Donovan, Repurchase Agreements After the 1984 Amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code, in REPURCHASE AND REVERSE REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS 145 (P.L.I.
1985) [hereinafter Levin & Donovan].
31. The text of the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) delineates the
duties of a SIPA trustee. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-1 (1982). That section incorporates
the duties of a bankruptcy trustee that are not inconsistent with SIPA. See 15
U.S.C. § 78fff-l(d) (1982).
32. A SIPA trustee liquidates the assets of members of the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation (SIPC) who are in danger of failing to meet their obligations
to customers and either are insolvent as that term is defined by the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(29) (Supp. III 1985), are the subject of any court or agency
proceeding in which a receiver, trustee or liquidator has been appointed; or fail
to comply with the Exchange Act's rules regarding financial responsibility or use
of customer securities. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78eee(b)(1), 78111(12) (1982).
33. A SIPA trustee is appointed to liquidate SIPC members. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78eee(b)(3) (1982). Membership in SIPA is limited to brokers or dealers registered
under 15 U.S.C. § 78o of the Exchange Act, and entities which are members of
a national securities exchange. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(2) (1982) ("all persons
registered as brokers or as dealers" required to become SIPC members); see also
id. § 78111(12) (1982) ("persons registered as broker-dealers" defined to include any
person who is a member of a national securities exchange).
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b)(1) (1982) (charging SIPA trustee with duty to
return customers securities); id. § 78fff-2(b)(2) (1982) (establishing method for
returning securities to customers).
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(b) (1982).
36. The SIPA trustee uses cash or securities received, acquired or held by the
insolvent broker for the account of his customers, and the proceeds of any such
property to reimburse customers. See 15 U.S.C. § 78111(4) (1982). In addition, the

FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. XV

Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC),3 7 a broker-dealer
funded corporation,3" to compensate investors for securities not set
aside.39
SIPC has limited resources.40 SIPA trustees, therefore, attempt to
maximize the assets of an insolvent broker-dealer's estate so that
4
those assets are sufficent, in themselves, to compensate customers. 1
Since SIPA trustees may be able to add assets characterized as
collateral to the insolvent's estate, 42 they urge courts to characterize
REPO transactions as loans and to treat the securities underlying
those REPOs as collateral. 43 Under such a characterization, the SIPA
trustees might be able to include securities involved in a REPO in
the failed broker's estate, 44 but exclude the securities' owners from
trustee can use the insolvent broker's own cash and securities to compensate
customers when the debtor should have set aside their cash and securities, but
failed to do so. See 15 U.S.C. § 78111(4)(D) (1982).
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(1) (1982). SIPC was created by SIPA. See id.
SIPA advances up to $500,000 to satisfy each customer's claim without regard
to whether the debtor's estate can reimburse SIPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3 (1982)
(authorizing SIPA trustee to use advances to buy securities for customers); id.
§ 78fff-2(b)(1) (1982) (requiring SIPC to advance funds to SIPA trustee whether
or not insolvent broker's estate can reimburse SIPC). In turn, SIPC is made a
subrogee to the customer's claim, id. at § 78fff-2(c)(1)(C) (1982), and recoups its
advance payments from the debtor's estate, Id. § 78fff-2(c)(1)(D) (1982). Therefore,
the customers, in effect, receive assets held for them by their dealer and, if necessary,
assets of SIPC.
38. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ccc(2) (1982) (mandating SIPC membership); id.
§ 78ddd(c) (1982) (requiring members to pay assessments into SIPC fund). Brokers
are required to be members of SIPC. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(2) (1982). Brokers
pay assessments to fund the organization. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd(c) (1982).
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(A) (1982). SIPA compensates each separate customer
for securities and cash worth up to $500,000. See id.
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd(a)(1) (1982) (SIPC is funded solely by assessing its
members and all disbursements of SIPC are paid out of that fund). But see id.
§ 78ddd(f) (SIPC can borrow money). See Brennan, The Role of SIPC in Brokerage
Failures: A Case Study of the Demise of Bell & Beckwith, 13 SEC. REG. L.J. 18,
36-37 (1985) (SIPC fund incapable of handling large liquidations).
41. SIPA gives its trustees the powers and duties of bankruptcy trustees, see
15 U.S.C. § 78fff-l(b) (1982), and bankruptcy trustees must maximize the assets
in a debtor's estate. See supra note 2. Therefore, the SIPA trustee has a duty to
maximize an insolvent broker-dealer's estate. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-l(b)(2)
(1982) (SIPA allows its trustees to repay loans of insolvent broker only if collateral
thus freed is worth more than face amount of loan).
42. See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Motion by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation as amicus
curiae at 9, In re E.S.M. Gov't Sec. Inc., Bankr. No. 85-6254 [hereinafter SIPC
Amicus Memorandum]; see also REPO Participants Not Customers, supra note

29, at 1003 (SIPC's position in ESM case); Oversight of Government Securities,
supra note 21,
83,760, at 87,405 n.50 (SEC noted SIPA's position that REPO
transaction is loan but that REPO participant is not "customer").
44. See infra notes 236-43 and accompanying text.
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qualifying as "customers," thus preventing them from recovering
45
their property.
After examining the basic structure of a REPO transaction, 46 this
Note recounts the history of the loan/sale controversy in bankruptcy
proceedings prior to 1984. 47 The Note then examines the policies
that prompted Congress to enact SIPA 4s and to confer certain powers
upon a SIPA trustee. 49 Against this background, the Note balances
the policy and practical effects of the loan classification against the
policy and practical effects of the sale classification.50 Finally, based
on this analysis, the Note concludes that courts should treat a REPO
transaction as a contract for a sale and a subsequent repurchase of
securities,"1 but that courts should not protect REPO participants
2
as "customers" under SIPA1
II.

The Structure of a REPO Transaction

A REPO transaction is an exchange, for a limited time, of securities
for cash. 53 It consists of two transactions which occur simultaneously:
(1) a sale; and (2) an agreement to repurchase.5 4 It is best illustrated
by the following example. On January 1, a pension fund, the REPO
transaction issuer, sells a corporate bond to a brokerage house, the
REPO transaction buyer, for $1,000. At the same time, the pension
fund agrees to repurchase the bond on February 1 for $1,010. The
additional $10 compensates the broker for the use of $1,000 in cash
between January 1 and February 1, and both parties view the $10
as an interest payment. 55
45. See infra notes 260-77 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 64-103 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 104-22 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 123-92 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 193-277 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 278-320 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 321-25 and accompanying text.
53. See SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Snow, Description
of the REPO Market, and the Positions of the Players, in REPURCHASE AND REVERSE
REPURCHASE AoREEMENTS 11 (P.L.I. 1985) [hereinafter Snow].
54. See First Nat'l Bank v. Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d 668, 669 (5th Cir.
1981); Cosmopolitan Credit & Inv. Corp. v. Blyth Eastman, 507 F. Supp. 954,
956 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 467.
55. See, e.g., SEC v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 295, 296 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), rev'd on other grounds, 785 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
2894 (1986) (classifying repurchase as repayment of cash with interest); S. GOLDFELD
& L.

CHANDLER, THE EcoNoMIcs OF MONEY AND BANKING 462 (8th ed. 1981); L.
RITTER & W. SILBER, PRINCIPLES OF MONEY BANKING AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 118

n.1 (3d ed. 1980).
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REPO transactions play an important role in the marketplace.
Typically, the parties who issue REPOs are investors who cannot
liquidate assets, but who need short-term capital.5 6 Conversely, parties
buying REPO transactions usually have cash that they will need in
7
the near future, but that they would like to use to generate income.
In the example above, the pension fund receives cash to use for

thirty-one days. In return, the broker receives: (1) underlying securities to secure its investment; 8 and (2) its cash back after thirtyone days plus interest.5

9

Courts find the REPO transaction hard to

characterize because it is a hybrid, displaying some characteristics
of a loan 6° and some characteristics of a sale and subsequent repurchase. 6' Nonetheless, in the early 1980's, whenever a REPO participant filed for bankruptcy 62 between the sale and the repurchase,
courts were forced to choose whether to characterize a REPO trans-

a contract for a sale and a subsequent repurchase
action as either
63
or as a loan.
56. See Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 467-68; Snow, supra note 52, at 14. Government
securities dealers have been able to use REPO transactions to generate income that
enables them to participate in still more REPO transactions. See id. at 18. In this
manner, the typical dealer is able to hold government securities worth much more
than the value of the capital he has available. See id.; M. STIGUM, THE MONEY
MARKET: MYTH REALITY AND PRACTICE 219 (1978) [hereinafter STIGUM].
57. See Miller,i 495 F. Supp. at 471; In re Financial Corp., 1 Bankr. 522, 525
(W.D. Mo. 1979), aff'd, 634 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); STIGUM, supra
note 56, at 316-18; see also Lucas, Jones & Thurston, FederalFunds and Repurchase
Agreements, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. Q. REv. 33, 45 (Summer 1977) [hereinafter
Lucas, Jones & Thurston]. For example, a municipality that has funds that have
been generated by a bond issue or tax receipts would find issuing a REPO attractive.
A municipality must have a certain amount of cash available to cover periodic
payments to contractors for the project supported by the bonds, or for day-today disbursements from the town budget. The amount of these payments and
disbursements is unpredictable, making an ordinary investment impractical. Additionally, state and local laws specifically prohibit many towns from making private
loans, but REPO transactions are beyond the scope of those restrictions. See Miller,
495 F. Supp. at 467; STIGUM, supra note 56, at 316-18; see also REPO Participants
Not Customers, supra note 29, at 1003-04 (SIPC specifically recognized that motivation in ESM).
58. See Drysdale Sec. Corp., 606 F. Supp. at 296; Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 467;
STIGUM, supra note 56, at 416-18; Lucas, Jones & Thurston, supra note 57, at 38
(supplier of funds in REPO receives securities).
59. Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 467; Drysdale Sec. Corp., 606 F. Supp at 296.
60. See infra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
62. A person may voluntarily file a bankruptcy petition, see 11 U.S.C. § 301
(1982), or creditors of the bankrupt may file a petition. See id. § 303 (1982).
63. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d 668, 669 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1981); .n re Financial Corp., 1, Bankr. 522, 525 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Gilmore
v. State Bd. of Admin., 382 So. 2d 861, 862 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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III.

The History of the Sale/Loan Controversy

Understandably, REPO participants urged courts to adopt the
characterization-loan or sale-that would allow them to control
the underlying securities. 64 Since the question was one of interpre65
tation and was hard fought by each side, courts split on the issue.
A.

REPO Transactions as Loans: The REPO Issuer's Argument
If REPO transactions are characterized as loans, REPO issuers

66
retain a property interest in the assets used to secure the loan.
A court that adopts this characterization may allow the representative

of an insolvent REPO issuer to reclaim those assets as part of the
bankrupt's estate. 67 Although participants structure REPO transactions as contracts for a sale and a subsequent repurchase of securities,68

of the transaction
REPO issuers urge courts to look behind the form
6 9'
and to concentrate on its "economic effect."
REPO issuers urge courts to focus on the fact that parties often

64. Compare Memorandum of Law in Support of Trustee's Application to Reregister and Sell Securities Located in Debtor's Clearing Account at 13, In re Bevill,
Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp., Civ. No. 85-1728, Adversary Proceeding No. 85-2103 (D.N.J. 1985) (SIPA supports sale view), reprinted in Levin
& Donovan, supra note 30, at 223 [hereinafter BBS Trustee's Memorandum of Law]
with SIPC Amicus Memorandum, supra note 43, at 9 (SIPA trustee supports loan
view).
65. Compare First Nat'l Bank v. Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d 668, 673-74 (5th
Cir. 1981) (REPO is 'a sale) and In re Financial Corp., 1 Bankr. 522, 526 n.7
(W.D. Mo. 1979) (same) and Gilmore v. State Bd. of Admin., 382 So. 2d 861,
863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (same) with In re Lombard Wall, No 82-B-11556
bench op. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1982) (REPO is a loan) and SEC v. Miller,
495 F. Supp. 465, 467 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same).
66. See Gilmore, 382 So. 2d at 863 (REPO buyer's memo confirming sale read:
"It is expressly understood and agreed that title to these securities shall remain vested
in [the REPO buyer] until full payment in cash or its equivalent is made therefore")
(emphasis in original); supra note 4.
67. See infra notes 244-59 and accompanying text.
68. See Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 467; see also Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d at
674; Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 426 F.2d 115, 117 n.2 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970); Cosmopolitan Credit & Inv. Corp. v. Blyth
Eastman Dillon Co., 507 F. Supp. 954, 956 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (industry rules require
that REPOs take form of sale).
69. See, e.g., Application for Order Approving Settlements of Outstanding
Reverse Repurchase Agreements Between Lombard-Wall Inc. and Tallman Home
Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n at 3, In re Lombard-Wall, Inc., No. 82-B-11556
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1982). SIPC has made it clear that it will espouse the
loan view when a SIPC trustee is holding collateral under a REPO transaction.
See, e.g., SIPC Amicus Memorandum, supra note 43, at 9.
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use REPO transactions to perform the same functions as loans.70
The participants compute the amount a REPO issuer must repay to
reflect a return of principal plus interest. 71 This amount remains
constant even if the market value of the underlying securities fluctuates. 72 Like a loan creditor, 73 a REPO buyer is unaffected by
market fluctuations in the value of the underlying securities unless
the underlying securities lose so much value that a REPO issuer is
induced to breach his commitment to repurchase. 74 In fact, some
REPO buyers allow REPO issuers to replace the securities originally
75
deposited as collateral with other securities that are of equal value.
In addition, the parties themselves often refer to REPO transactions
using the terms employed by lenders and borrowers. 76 For example,
REPO issuers are said to pay "interest" for the use of cash,7 7 and
REPO buyers hold the assets used in REPO transactions "as collateral."17 Thus, REPO transactions can easily be classified as loans.

70. See Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d at 669; Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 467 n.2.
71. See Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d at 669; Cosmopolitan Credit & Inv. Corp.,
507 F. Supp. at 956; Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 467.
72. See First Am. Nat'l Bank v.United States, 467 F.2d 1098, 1101 (6th Cir.
1972); Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 426 F.2d at 117.
73. See Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d at 675; Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 467; see also
First Am. Nat'l Bank, 467 F.2d at 101; Need for Legislative Action, supra note
10, at 837.
74. See Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 472-73. REPO contracts protect REPO buyers
from the risk that the market value of the underlying securities will fall intwo
ways: (1)the securities in some REPO transactions are sold for less than their
market value to protect the REPO buyer's equity ifthe value of the securities
declines slightly, see id. at 470, 472-73; and (2) some REPOs give buyers the right
to request additional securities from the REPO issuers if the value of collateral
falls. See Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release
No. 18,418 [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 83,084 n.18 (Jan. 13,
1982) [hereinafter Net Capital Requirements].
75. See Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 469; Portnoy, supra note 10, at 19, col. 4; see
also Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d at 670 (REPO transaction involved did not restrict
REPO buyer's right to sell or otherwise dispose of securities as long as securities
of like kind delivered at specified date); In re Legel, Braswell Gov't Sec., Inc., 648
F.2d 321, 324 (5th Cir. 1981) (REPO issuer given right to purchase "equivalent
securities").
76. See Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 467 (parties customarily refer to underlying
securities as collateral). But see Gilmore v.State Bd. of Admin., 382 So. 2d 861,
863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (loan terminology alone not dispositive).
77. See Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 467; see also Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d at
670; Drysdale Sec. Corp., 606 F. Supp. at 296.
78. See Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 467; Sun First Nat'l Bank v.Niller, 77 F.R.D.
430, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see also STIGUM, supra note 56, at 382; Portnoy, supra
note 10, at 19, col. 3.
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B. REPO Transactions as Sales and Subsequent Repurchases:
the REPO Buyer's Argument
In contrast, REPO buyers who hope to retain the assets the
insolvent REPO issuer transferred in the REPO, urge that courts
should characterize REPOs as contracts for sales and subsequent
repurchases. 79 Under such a characterization, a bankruptcy trustee
would be unable to claim that asset as part of the bankrupt's estate.80
Many REPO issuers structure REPO transactions as sales and
subsequent repurchases because they cannot issue loans, or because
any loans they make must comply with restrictive regulations. 8
Accordingly, they argue that the court should focus on the intent
of the contracting parties 82 and the form of the transaction. 3 In
addition, they argue that the REPO buyer takes full legal title to
the underlying securities.8 4 REPO issuers point to this characteristic
as evidence that the REPO buyer's obligation to return securities is
purely contractual.85 This interpretation leads to the conclusion that
the REPO issuer has no ownership interest in the securities between

79. See BBS Trustee's Memorandum of Law, supra note 64, reprinted in Snow,
supra note 53, at 11 (P.L.I. 1985).
80. See Mitchell, supra note 10, at 6, col. 1. A REPO issuer would not have
any legal or equitable interest in securities unconditionally sold to a good faith
purchaser, see 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982); but an insolvent REPO issuer's estate would
only have a contract right to retrieve the collateral. See id.; see also In re Financial
Corp., 1 Bankr. 522, 526 (W.D. Mo. 1979); 4 COLLIER, supra note 4,
541.0816],
at 541-51. But see infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text (SIPA trustee can
void sale if it violates state law, is fraudulent, or gives preference to one creditor
at expense of other creditors).

81. See Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 497; see also Repo ParticipantsNot Customers,
supra note 29, at 1003-04; Need for Legislative Action, supra note 10, at 836-41.
82. See BBS Trustee's Memorandum of Law, supra note 64, at 223. Some
courts have focused on the intent of the parties. See, e.g., Estate of Russell, 657
F.2d at 670; In re Financial Corp., 1 Bankr. 522, 526 (W.D. Mo. 1979). But see
Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 426 F.2d 115, 117 (6th Cir.) (intent
not relevant for tax purposes), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970); Cosmopolitan
Credit & Inv. Corp., 507 F. Supp. at 956 (title to underlying securities remained
with REPO issuer after sale).
83. See, e.g., BBS Trustee's Memorandum of Law, supra note 64, at 223.
Courts have also considered the form of a REPO transaction in determining whether
it is a sale or loan. See, e.g., Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 426 F.2d at 117 n.2;
Gilmore v. State Bd. of Admin., 382 So. 2d 861, 862 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
84. See Gilmore, 382 So. 2d at 863; Mitchell, supra note 10, at 6, col. 1. But
see Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d at 676 n.23 (whether parties intended title to pass
deemed inconclusive).
85. See In re Financial Corp., I Bankr. 522, 526 (W.D. Mo. 1979). Most REPO
contracts allow the REPO buyer to use underlying securities freely. See, e.g., In
re Legel, Braswell Gov't Sec., 648 F.2d 321, 325 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981); Miller, 495
F. Supp. at 469; Gilmore, 382 So. 2d at 863.
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the sale and the repurchase. 86 In support of this interpretation, REPO
buyers point out that many REPO transactions allow a REPO buyer to
sell the underlying securities as long as the REPO buyer subsequently
buys replacement securities that allow him to satisfy his contractual
commitment.817 A creditor would never be permitted to act in an
analogous way with ordinary loan collateral.88
C.

REPO Transactions Under the Bankruptcy Act Prior to 1984

Treating REPO transactions as loans in bankruptcy proceedings
would have significantly increased the risks for REPO buyers.8 9 Under
such a classification, the REPO issuer would have retained an equity
interest in the underlying securities held by the REPO buyer. 90 When
the underlying securities have been so encumbered, the REPO buyer
could have been subject to two risks. First, upon a REPO issuer's
bankruptcy, a bankruptcy trustee could have used the REPO issuer's
retained ownership interest to force the REPO buyer to turn over underlying securities. 91 Second, if the REPO buyer kept the securities, the
bankruptcy trustee could have prevented a REPO buyer from liquidating securities after bankruptcy proceedings commenced.9 2 Consequently, if the market value of the underlying securities declined,
the REPO buyer could have been forced to stand idle as the value
of his collateral diminished and an increasing portion of the debt that
the REPO issuer owed to him became unsecured. 93 This result would
have created a tremendous amount of risk in an instrument once seen
as safe.
86. See Gilmore, 382 So. 2d at 862; Financial Corp., 1 Bankr. at 526.
87. Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 469; Gilmore, 382 So. 2d at 862; Lucas, Jones &
Thurston, supra note 57, at 44; Portnoy, supra note 10, at 19, col. 4.
88. See U.C.C. § 9-207 (1978). A secured party must use reasonable care in
the custody and preservation of collateral. See id. In fact, the secured party is

liable for any loss due to his failure to preserve collateral. See id. § 9-207(3).
89. See Quint, supra note 15, at 3, col. 5; Need for Legislative Action, supra
note 10, at 831.
90. See Need for Legislative Action, supra note 10, at 833; Mitchell, supra note
10, at 6, col. 1; Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 18, col. 3.
91. See Quint, supra note 15, at 3, col. 1; Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 18,
col. 3.
92. See Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 18, col. 3; see also Mitchell, supra note
10, at 1, col. 1; Portnoy, supra note 10, at 19, col. 1.
93. See Portnoy, supra note 10 at 25, col. 2; see also Letter From Paul Volker,
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, to Robert Dole, Chairman of the Subcomm.

on Courts of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary (Jan. 20, 1983), reprinted in
Bankruptcy Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Senate Judiciary
Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 305 (Jan. 24, 1983) (REPO buyer subject to risk

of capital loss should interest rates change) [hereinafter Volker Letter].
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These risks became probable rather than possible in September,
1982 when Lombard-Wall, a government securities dealer with many
outstanding REPO transactions, filed for bankruptcy.9" In In re
Lombard-Wall, Inc. ,95Federal Bankruptcy Judge Edward Ryan ruled
96
that the open REPO transactions held by that dealer were loans.
Judge Ryan thus implied that the securities pledged for REPO
transactions should be considered ordinary loan collateral. 97 This
holding caused a great deal of uncertainty in the securities markets. 9
D.

Congress' Response: The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1984

The Lombard-Wall decision spurred industry groups to lobby for
changes in the Bankruptcy Code.99 Congress adopted those changes
in 1984.100 Although Congress solved the problem, it failed to settle

whether a REPO transaction is a loan or a contract for a sale and
a subsequent repurchase. 01 It merely promulgated regulations to
insure that a REPO buyer would be able to liquidate securities

involved in REPO transactions' 0 2 and prohibited bankruptcy trustees
94. See In re Lombard-Wall, Inc., 23 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(circumstances leading to Lombard-Wall's insolvency set forth in action for fraud
brought by trustee); Holland, Repurchase Agreements Appearing Everywhere, 1
BANKING ExPANSION REP. 11 (1982) [hereinafter Holland]; Schwarcz, supra note
19, at 18, col. 3; see also Note, Lifting the Cloud of Uncertainty Over the Repo
Market: Characterization of Repos as Separate Purchases and Sales of Securities,
37 VAND. L. REv. 401, 410-12 (1984) [hereinafter Lifting the Cloud].
95. In re Lombard-Wall, 23 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
96. See Transcript of Record of Hearing on Sept. 16, 1982, at 3, In re LombardWall, Inc., Bankr. No. 82-B-11556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Quint, supra note 15,
at 3, col. 2.
97. See Quint, supra note 15, at 3, col. 2; see also Portnoy, supra note 10,
at 19, col. 1 (analyzing import of holding that REPOS were loans); cf. Mitchell,
supra note 15, at 1, col. 1 (same).
98. See S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1983), [hereinafter 1983
SENATE REPORT]; Volker Letter, supra note 93, at 305.
99. See Bankruptcy Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Senate
Judiciary Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 305, 307 (Jan. 24, 1983) (Thomas Strauss,
testifying for Public Securities Association confirmed that PSA and virtually
entire financial industry had come together in strong support of amending Bankruptcy Code to protect REPO participants) [hereinafter 1983 Senate Hearings]; see
also Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 18, col 1.
100. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.

No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333; see also Cooper, supra note 19, at 30; Schwarcz, supra
note 19, at 18, col. 2.
101. The amendments require a court to determine only whether a transaction
satisfies the statutory definition of a REPO transaction. See 1983 Senate Hearings,
supra note 99, at 323 (submission of Peter J.Sternlight, Executive Vice President,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York); Levin & Donovan, supra note 30, at 154.
102. See 1983 SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 48.
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from unilaterally forcing REPO buyers to turn over underlying

securities. 03
1
IV.

SIPA

In enacting the 1984 amendment to the Bankruptcy Code, Congress
failed to decide how courts should treat REPO transactions in the

liquidation of a securities dealer' °4 under SIPA.' °5 In SIPA, enacted
in 1970, Congress established the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), 1°6 a private corporation similar in purpose to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 0 7 SIPC compensates
investors who suffer losses due to the bankruptcy of securities

dealers. 08 In effect, it establishes a separate class of creditors called
"customers"

who are given priority when a broker becomes in-

solvent. ,09

103. See generally id.
104. Congress intended to prevent a bankruptcy trustee from using the automatic
stay of the Bankruptcy Code to prevent transfers of securities involved in REPO
transactions. See 130 CONG. REC. S8887 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of
Sen. Strom Thurmond), (reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 585).
Congress, however, continued to allow a SIPA trustee to use SIPA's automatic
stay to prevent transfers of securities underlying a REPO. See 11 U.S.C. § 559
(Supp. III 1985). Although Congress decided to subject underlying securities to
SIPA's automatic stay, Congress did not address whether REPO participants should
be considered "customers" under SIPA. See generally Oversight of Government
Securities, supra note 21,
83,760, at 87,404 n.50 (SIPA treatment of REPO
transactions is open question); supra note 30 and accompanying text).
105. See Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (1970) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1982)). SIPA is a statutory scheme with a different policy
orientation than the Bankruptcy Code. See 4 COLLIER, supra note 4, subch. III,
at Int-2. SIPA attempts to protect certain public "customers" identified in the
Act. See id. As a practical matter, the difference between a bankruptcy proceeding
and a SIPA proceeding is that the Bankruptcy Code requires that the bankruptcy
trustee convert securities to cash as quickly as possible, see id., subch. III at Int5, while SIPA charges a SIPA trustee with distributing securities to customers. See
id. The Bankruptcy Code operates under two assumptions: (1) customers prefer
cash; and (2) even if a customer prefers his securities, he can repurchase those
securities before any change in market value occurs, if he receives cash promptly.
See id. at Int-6. Conversely, the assumption underlying SIPA is that a customer
is an investor and desires to retain his securities. See id. at Int-5. Thus, in a SIPA
proceeding, the SIPA trustee will return securities to customers to the maximum
extent possible. See id. at Int-6; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-l(b) (1982).
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(1) (1982).
107. See H.R. REP. No. 1613, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5254, 5255 [hereinafter 1970 House Report].
108. See 1970 HousE REPORT, supra note 107, at 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
& ADMIN. NEWS 5255; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(b) (1982). SIPA creates

CONG.

a fund to allow public customers of securities dealers to recover the cash and securities
that are in their accounts at the time of insolvency. See id.
109. See SEC v. Kenneth Bove & Co., 378 F. Supp. 697, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
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SIPA trustees have taken the position that underlying securities
should be classified as loan collateral."10 They refuse, however, to
recognize REPO participants as customers who can assert SIPA
claims."' Critics maintain that such an interpretation is at odds with
2
the policies Congress intended to further when it enacted SIPA."
A.

SIPA's Legislative History

The primary purpose in enacting SIPA" 3 was to "provide protection for investors if the broker-dealer with whom they are doing
business encounters financial troubles.""14 The legislation accomplishes this purpose by attempting to eliminate the risks that lead
to customer loss." 5 While speaking at the House hearings to create
SIPA, Phillip A. Loomis, General Counsel of the Securities Exchange
Commission, pinpointed three such risks."16 Those risks are: (1) the
risk that securities deposited by a customer are not held by the
broker-dealer as they should be; (2) the risk that securities a customer
pledges for a margin loan are not treated in a way that protects
the customer's equity in the securities; and (3) the risk that when
a customer orders his broker to transfer securities, his broker may
17
not do so."
To minimize these risks, Congress included provisions in SIPA
that give customers an unrestricted right to receive their securities. ' 8 Courts satisfy the claims of SIPA customers before the
claim of any other person who did business with an insolvent
securities broker." 9 SIPA defines "customers" as those with securities

(Congress intended to afford SIPA customers relief akin to preference given to
reclamation claim in traditional bankruptcies); see also SIPC v. Executive Sec.
Corp., 556 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1977) (SIPA affords "customers" preferential
status).
110. See SIPC Amicus Memorandum, supra note 43, at 8-9.
111. See id. at 23; see also Oversight of Government Securities, supra note 21,
83,760 (SIPC's official position is that REPO participants are not "customers").
112. See infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
113. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat.
1636 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1982)).
114. See 1970 HousE REPORT, supra note 107, at 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5254, 5255.
115. See 1970 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 107, at 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5254, 5256.

116. See Securities Investor Protection: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 228 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 House Hearings].
117. See id.
118. See 1970 HousE REPORT, supra note 107, at 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5254, 5256.
119. See SEC v. Packer Wilbur & Co., 498 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir. 1974); SIPA
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accounts received, acquired or held by the debtor in one of three
ways: (1) with a view to sale; (2) as collateral security; or (3) for
safekeeping.12 0 If SIPA classifies an investor as a customer, that
customer is entitled to receive his securities.' 2 ' If not, he would
be entitled to make a claim only as a bankruptcy creditor, after all
22
customers have been satisfied.
B.

The Role of a SIPA Trustee

A SIPA trustee handles two types of customer claims: claims for
securities registered in the names of specific customers (customer
name securities)' 23 and claims for securities registered in the broker's
name, but held for customers (customer property).' 24 A trustee's
first duty is to distribute the "customer name securities.'

' 25

Only

after this initial distribution will the SIPA trustee pool the remaining
customer securities to form the "customer property" fund, 26 which
is composed of securities held for customers, but registered in the
v. Executive Sec. Corp., 423 F. Supp. 94, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d
98 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Kenneth Bove & Co., 378 F. Supp. 697, 699 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 78111(2) (1982). The definition of "customer" also includes
those with securities held to cover consummated sales and for purposes of effecting
transfer. See id. Congress wished to clarify that SIPA protects the owners of
securities held in bulk. See 1970 HouSE REPORT, supra note 107, at 9, reprinted

in 1970 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& ADMIN.

NEWS

5254, 5263. A SIPA "customer"

is

one who entrusts securities or cash to a broker for investment purposes. See SEC
v. Seggos & Co., 416 F. Supp. 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Kenneth Bove & Co.,
378 F. Supp. at 700.
121. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(b) (1982). See infra notes 186-92 and accompanying
text for a discussion of how customer claims are satisfied.
747.01, at
122. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(1) (1982); 4 COLLIER, supra note 4,
747-3. After "customers" are satisfied, the liquidation continues as in a normal
bankruptcy and creditors must look to the general assets of the insolvent broker's
estate for satisfaction. See Kenneth Bove & Co., 378 F. Supp. at 700.
123. See 15 U.S.C. § 78111(3) (1982). Securities held for the account of a customer
on the filing date, or in the process of being registered to a customer on the filing
date are "customer name securities," but securities which were in negotiable form
on the filing date are not customer name securities. See id.
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 78111(4) (1982).
125. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(a)(1)(A) (1982). The SIPA trustee must deliver "customer name securities" if a customer is not indebted to the insolvent broker-dealer,
or if a customer who is indebted repays the debt to the trustee. Id. § 78fff2(c)(2). The SIPA trustee determines the time limit within which a customer has
to pay his debt, see id. § 78fff-2(c)(2), but the SIPA trustee cannot refuse payments made within a reasonable time. See In re John Muir & Co., 28 Bankr.
946 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (when customer has failed to pay his margin 60 days
after he received notice of SIPA proceeding, reasonable time elapsed and trustee
need not treat stock in question as "customer property").
126. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78111(4) (1982) (definition of customer property); id.
§ 78fff-2(b) (requirement that SIPA trustee deliver customer property); id. § 78fff-
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broker's name. 27 Once the contents of the fund are collected, the
SIPA trustee begins to use the powers vested in him by the Bankruptcy Code and by SIPA to compensate for any deficiency in the
customer property fund and to deliver the collected securities to
customers. 128
A SIPA trustee must fulfill the duties of a traditional bankruptcy
trustee, while protecting the securities and cash claimed by customers. 129 The Bankruptcy Code charges a SIPA trustee with maximizing the insolvent's estate. 30 To accomplish this, the SIPA trustee
exercises a bankruptcy trustee's power to avoid preferential transfers,

stay liquidations, and force creditors to turn over assets in which
the estate has an interest.' 3' In addition, the trustee is directed by
SIPA to protect customers' rights to receive securities that are of

the same class and series as those that were in the customer's account
at insolvency.3 2 To accomplish this goal he is given a second set
of powers by SIPA.3 3
2(c)(1) (guidelines for distributing customer property). Before the SIPA trustee
distributes the "customer property" fund, however, the SIPA trustee reimburses
SIPC for any money it advanced to pay or guarantee the debts of the failed brokerdealer. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff-l(b)(2) (1982) (granting power to use SIPC funds
to pay debts); id. § 78fff-2(c)(1)(B) (providing that trustee must reimburse SIPC)
(1982). Then, after the fund satisfies all customers' claims, SIPC receives another
disbursement from the fund, this time as subrogee for the claims of customers.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(l)(C) (1982). Finally, the customer property fund reimburses SIPC for cash that it advanced to enable the trustee to indemnify brokers
who agreed to accept the insolvent's customer accounts. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78fff-3(c)(2) (1982) (providing for transfer of customer accounts); id. § 78fff2(c)(1)(D) (providing that SIPC trustee must reimburse SIPC).
127. See id. § 78111(4) (.1982) (term "customer property" means cash and securities,
except customer name securities delivered to customer, at any time received, acquired,
or held by or for debtor from or for customer's securities account).
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3) (1982) (trustee can recover transfers whenever
customer property is insufficent to both pay customer claims and reimburse SIPC
for any cash advanced); see also 4 COLLIER, supra note 4, 749.02, at 749-9.
129. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-l(b)(1) (1982). In addition to liquidating the assets
of the debtor as in an ordinary bankruptcy a SIPA trustee must deliver securities
to customers that are of the same class and series as the securities that should
have been in the customer's account at the time of his insolvency. See id.
130. SIPA trustees are vested with the same duties as interim bankruptcy trustees,
see 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-l(b) (1982). Interim bankruptcy trustees have essentially the
same duties as permanent bankruptcy trustees. See 11 U.S.C. § 701 (1982); 4
COLLIER, supra note 4,
701.04. The duties of a permanent bankruptcy trustee
include maximizing the value of the debtor's estate. See In re Gustav Schaeffer
Co., 103 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1939); see also SEC v. Albert & McGuire Sec. Co.,
560 F.2d 569, 574 (3rd Cir. 1977) (SIPA also requires trustee to maximize customer
property).
131. See infra notes 134-48 and accompanying text.
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-l(b)(1) (1982).
133. A SIPA trustee is given the power: (1) to pay or guarantee the debts of
the failed broker-dealer, see id. § 78 fff-l(b)(2) (1982); (2) to transfer customer
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A SIPA Trustee's Bankruptcy Powers

The Bankruptcy Code provides that the estate of a debtor includes
"all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property ....
When a court considers an asset to be property of the insolvent

broker's estate, SIPA automatically freezes that asset, 35 and then
the Bankruptcy Code forces any creditors with an interest in that
asset to petition the court to lift the stay. 3 6 In addition, a SIPA
trustee can force others to return assets transferred before insolvency, 13 7 if he can set aside that transfer.'3 8

Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code prevents "any act to
obtain possession of . . . or to exercise control over the property
of the estate.' 3 9 This stay is automatic,' 40 and an affected person
opposing the stay must bring a legal proceeding to convince the

court that the stay should be lifted because it irreparably damages
4
his interest in property.' 1

accounts, and indemnify brokers to whom accounts are transferred, see id. § 78fff2(f) (1982); (3) to purchase securities in a fair and orderly market in order to
satisfy the claims of "customers," see id. § 78fff-2(d) (1982); (4) to close out open
contractual commitments of the failed broker, see id. § 78fff-2(e) (1982); (5) to
recover transfers of securities that are void or voidable under the Bankruptcy Code,
see id. § 78fff-2(c)(2) (1982); and (6) to recover transfers that are preferential under
the Bankruptcy Code. See id. § 78fff-l(a) (1982).
134. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982). That section, however, contains many
exceptions and exemptions. See id.; BANKR. R. 4003.
135. See infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
136. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982); 2 COLLIER, supra note 4,
362.01.
137. See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
138. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
139. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (Supp. III 1982). This statute provides that when
an application is filed under section 5(a)(3) of SIPA, see 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(3)
(1982), all proceedings concerning property of the estate are barred. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) (1982). While section 362(b)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code establishes the right
of a REPO participant to set off any margin or settlement payment for a REPO,
see id. § 362(b)(7) (Supp. III 1985), that section only applies to REPOS created
with certain types of collateral securities such as certificates of deposit, United
States guaranteed securities, and eligible banker's acceptances. See id. § 101(35)
(Supp. III 1985). In addition, while section 559 of the Bankruptcy Code, see id.
§ 559 (Supp. III 1985), seeks to protect a REPO participant's right to liquidate
collateral, that protection does not apply to proceedings under SIPA. See id.
140. See 2 COLLIER, supra note 4, 362.03, at 363-26. The stay is automatically
created when the SIPA petition is filed. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982). An affected
party may, however, request a hearing to lift the stay, see id. § 362(d) (1982),
and if that party can show it has an interest in property that would not be
adequately protected unless the stay is lifted, or if he can show that the bankrupt
does not have an ownership interest in the property in question, the stay will be
lifted. See id. § 362(d) (1982).
141. See id. § 362(e) (1982). The statute requires a court to vacate the stay thirty
days after a request for relief unless the court, after notice and a preliminary
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Similarly, sections 550(a) and 542 of the Bankruptcy Code allow
a SIPA trustee to force a creditor holding "estate property" to turn
it over for use by the estate.142 Under section 542, if the SIPA
trustee convinces the court that the REPO buyer's interest would
remain adequately protected when the property is used,143 the SIPA
trustee can regain possession of the securities.'"

Section 550(a) gives a SIPA trustee a right to repossess any property
if he can invalidate the bankrupt's transfer of that property.' 4 1 Section
544 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a SIPA trustee to set aside
transfers that can be voided under state law; 46 section 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code allows a SIPA trustee to set aside fraudulent
transfers; 47 and section 547 allows a SIPA trustee to set aside

transfers that give preference to one creditor at the cost of other
creditors. 4 After a SIPA trustee sets aside transfers using these
hearing, see id. § 102(1) (1982) (definition of "notice and a preliminary hearing"),
finds no reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief will prevail at a full
hearing. See id. § 362 (1982); 4 COLLIER, supra note 4,
362.08. While the party
seeking relief from the stay must prosecute the action at the full hearing, the party
supporting the stay has the burden of proof. Id.
362.08[2].
142. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 542(b) (1982); id. § 550(c). These sections make few
exceptions. Property held by a REPO participant who, in good faith and without
knowledge of the bankruptcy retransfers the property need not be turned over.
See id. § 550(b).

143. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(o) (Supp. III 1985).
144. See 15 U.S.C. § 542 (1982). The SIPA trustee can also use property of
the estate to satisfy customer claims if the bankrupt failed to hold customers'
securities as required by securities laws and regulations. See 15 U.S.C. § 78111(4)(D)
(1982).
145. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1982); 4 COLLIER, supra note 4,
550.02, at 55012.
146. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982). Section 544(a) is commonly called the strongarm clause because it gives the trustee the status of a judicial lien creditor or a
creditor holding an execution returned unsatisfied. See id. § 544(a). It gives the
SIPA trustee the rights of a creditor who has gone to court and secured either
an order placing a lien on the property of the bankrupt, or a writ of execution
against the bankrupt's property which has not yet been satisfied. See H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 370 (1977). Acting in that capacity, the SIPA trustee
can bring state law claims to void transfers. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982); 4
COLLIER, supra note 4,
544.01, at 544-3. Then, when transfers are voided, the
trustee can assert ownership of the property involved. See id.
147. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1982). The Bankruptcy Code allows a SIPA
trustee to show that a transfer was fraudulent either by proving fraudulent intent,

see id., or by showing that the transfer was made for less than reasonable value.
See id. § 548(a)(2). Section 548 states that settlement payments in connection with
with REPO transactions are always made for reasonable value. See 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 548(d)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1986). A "settlement payment" is a payment of the
repurchase price. 11 U.S.C. § 741(8) (Supp. Ill 1982). Therefore, § 548 effectively
requires a SIPA trustee to prove that REPO participants who executed a repurchase
intended to defraud creditors. See 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 99, at 325.
148. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982). Six elements establish a preference under
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Code sections, he can assert his property right in the collateral and
149
force the transferee to return the property to the estate.
2.

A SIPA Trustee's SIPA Powers
A SIPA trustee can also use powers SIPA has granted him to
compensate for deficiencies in the customer property fund. 150 Bankruptcy powers are generally sufficient to recover securities held for
sale, 5 ' but SIPA provisions grant powers better equipped to deal

the Bankruptcy Code: (1) the property must be transferred; (2) the transfer must
be for the benefit of a creditor; (3) the debtor must have been insolvent at the
time; (4) the transfer must give the creditor more than the share he would receive
as a creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding; (5) the transfer must occur within 90
days of insolvency; and (6) the transfer must be payment of an antecedent debt,
and must diminish the debtor's estate. See id. § 547 (1982); 4 COLLIER, supra
note 4,
547.01, at 541-11 to -12. The Bankruptcy Code considers a security
interest to be a transfer for an antecedent debt if, after the transfer occurs, the
two principals fail to make the transfer unassailable by complying with the procedures
of state U.C.C. provisions. See 4 COLLIER, supra note 4,
547.44 at 547-137 to
-139; U.C.C. § 8-321 (1978). This is called "perfecting" the transfer. See id.
The Bankruptcy Code allows parties to wait ten days before they perfect. See
11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (1982). If the parties fail to perfect within ten days, the
Bankruptcy Code will not deem the security interest transferred until the transfer
is perfected. See id. § 547(e)(2)(B). If the parties never perfect, the Code deems
the security interest transferred as of the time that the bankruptcy petition is filed.
See id. § 547(e)(2)(C). The rules for perfection are complex, and differ among
states. For a discussion of perfecting a REPO, see Kraemer, Creation and Perfection
of Security Interests in Securities Under the U.C.C., in REPURCHASE AND REVERSE
REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS (P.L.I. 1985) [hereinafter Kraemer].
The SIPA trustee can also avoid the claims of unsecured creditors filed under
§ 501 of the Bankruptcy Code, see II U.S.C. § 501 (1982), but since this Note
assumes that a REPO transaction creates a security interest, and is not an unsecured
pledge, see supra note 4, section 501 does not apply to REPO transactions as they
are treated by this Note.
149. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1982); see also 4 COLLIER, supra note 4, 550.02.
150. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-l (1982) for a general statement of the powers and
duties of a SIPA trustee. The specific powers at a trustee's disposal are scattered
throughout the Act. They are: (1) The power to pay or guarantee debts owed by
the debtor subject to prior approval of SIPC, see 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-l(b)(2) (1982);
(2) the power to transfer or sell customer accounts, to margin those accounts for
transfer, and to use SIPC funds to indemnify transferees against financial losses,
see id. § 78fff-2(f) (1982); (3) the power to purchase the securities needed to satisfy
customer claims, see id. § 78fff-2(d) (1982); (4) the power to complete open
contractual commitments of the debtor, see id. § 78fff-2(e) (1982); (5) the power
to recover transfers that are void or voidable under the Bankruptcy Code, see id..
§ 78fff-2(c)(3) (1982); (6) the power to avoid preferences as would a bankruptcy
trustee; see id. § 78fff-l(a) (1982); and (7) the power to forestall adverse judicial
proceedings concerning the property of the estate. See id. § 78eee(b) (1982).

151. See supra note 149 (discussing SIPA trustee powers under SIPA); supra
notes 134-41 (effect of filing SIPA petition).
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with securities held as collateral for a margin loan,'5

2

deposited for

safekeeping with another broker"' or in the process of being trans14
ferred when a broker defaults. 1
The Securities Act treats securities for which a customer has fully
paid differently than it treats securities a customer has bought on
credit, or "margined."' '
A broker can lend money to its customers

and is permitted to speculate with securities that a customer has
given as collateral for a margin loan. 5 6 Securities regulations, however, require a broker to deliver margin securities as soon as a
customer has fully paid for them.' 57 Therefore, a customer's equity
in securities must always be protected.5 8
SIPA goes one step further. Even after the speculating broker's
insolvency, SIPA allows customers who bought securities on margin
to repay the margin loan and free the securities from encumbrance. 5 9
At that point, the SIPA trustee treats customers as if they had fully
paid for the margin securities at the SIPA filing date. 16° SIPA also
protects a margin customer when his broker deposits securities with
another broker for safekeeping.

152.
153.
154.
155.

See
See
See
See

infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
infra notes 162-74 and accompanying text.
infra notes 175-85 and accompanying text.
In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman, Inc., 59 Bankr. 353, 357 (D.N.J.

1986). Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.8c-1 (1986) (financial responsibility rules for
margined securities) with id. § 240.15c3-3 (1986) (financial responsibility rules
applicable to fully paid securities).
156. Margined securities are often used by a broker to realize cash. See 2 L.
Loss, SECUITIES REGULATION 1248 n.32 (1961). For example, the broker can use

them as collateral for bank loans. See id. at 1244-48; see also 1970 HousE REPORT,
supra note 107, at 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5254,
5256. Securities regulations prohibit a broker from: (1) comingling the customer's

margin securities with those of other customers without the customer's assent; (2)
encumbering more than one customer's securities in the same loan, without the
customer's consent; and (3) subjecting a customer's securities to any lien or claim
of a pledgee in excess of the aggregate margin that the customer owes to the
debtor. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.8c-l (1986).

157. See id. § 240.15c3-3(l)(2) (1986).
158. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 115, at 228 (statement of Phillip A.
Loomis Jr., General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission) (securities laws
are designed to protect customers' equity in margined securities, but Congress enacted
SIPA to ensure that if those safeguards fail, customers are protected).
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(2) (1982); see also S. REP. No. 763, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONo. & ADMIN. NEWS 764, 766 (detailing
options open to margin customer); H.R. REp. No. 746, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 21
(1977) (customer expects to receive contents of his account, and SIPA allows him

to do so if he pays his margin) [hereinafter 1977 HousE REPORT].
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(b)(2) (1982). Customers who have bought securities
on margin are entitled to share in the "customer property" fund to the extent of
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possess or control sepaid, 61 and that were
In a SIPA liquidation,
with a second broker

"for safekeeping,"' 6 the SIPA trustee representing the depositing

broker must reacquire the same or identical securities and return
them to the depositing broker's customers.' 64 If those securities are
subject to a lien, SIPA authorizes a trustee to pay or guarantee debts
up to the market value of the securities encumbered,' 65 and if the
market value of the customer's securities has become less than the
debt owed on them, the SIPA trustee must default on repaying the
loans'66 and can use the principal to replace the lost collateral.' 67
On the other side of the transaction, if it is the safekeeping broker
who becomes insolvent, SIPA protects both individual investors and
the market as a whole. SIPA protects individual investors from the
risk of losing securities 16 by requiring a SIPA trustee to return
securities that were deposited with the insolvent broker either by an

their net equity in margined securities. See id. § 78fff-2(c)(1)(B) (1982). Net equity
is computed by determining the dollar value of a customer's account at insolvency
and subtracting the indebtedness of that customer. See id. § 78111(11) (1982).
A customer may pay his margin, however, within a reasonable time from the
date the customer receives notice of the SIPA proceeding, and will be treated as
a fully paid customer. See id. § 78111(11)(c) (1982). But, a customer cannot pay his
margin more than 60 days after the SIPA trustee notifies him of the liquidation.
See In re John Muir & Co., 28 Bankr. 947 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
161. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (1986).
162. See id. § 240.15c3-3(a)(l) ("customer" means any person from whom, or
on whose behalf, a broker or dealer has received, acquired, or held funds or
securities).
163. See 15 U.S.C. § 78111(2) (1982) (SIPA definition of "customer" includes
investors whose securities are held for safekeeping).
164. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
165. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-l(b)(2) (1982); id. § 78fff-3(c)(l). The SIPA trustee,
with SIPA approval, can use SIPC advances to pay or guarantee loans made to
the insolvent broker-dealer if the market value of securities thus made available is
not less than the debt. See id. The SIPA trustee apportions the freed securities to
customer property in the same ratio that customer property held to the insolvent's
assets in the lien, see id. § 78fff(d) (1982), and the SIPA trustee reimburses SIPC
for those advances before it makes any other disbursements from the "customer
property" fund. See id. § 78fff-2(c)(1)(A) (1982).
166. See id. § 78fff-l(b)(2) (1982).
167. See id. § 78fff-2(d) (1982). A SIPA trustee can use customer property to
pay for securities needed to satisfy customers. See id. Customer property includes
the proceeds of securities acquired or held for the account of a customer. See id.
§ 78111(4) (1982).
168. See id. § 78fff-3 (1982). SIPC will advance up to $500,000 for the account
of each customer for whom the insolvent broker failed to hold, as he should have,
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individual investor or by a broker acting as an agent for an individual

investor. 169
This SIPA provision also protects the marketplace.' Prior to SIPA,
when a broker holding securities for another broker's customers
became insolvent, the Bankruptcy Code considered deposited securities assets of the holding broker's estate in bankruptcy.17 ° The
customers of the depositing broker were entitled to claim those assets
in a bankruptcy proceeding, but typically they received only a portion
of the market value of their securities.1 7 1 In such circumstances,
claims for lost securities made by its customers could have placed

the depositing broker in financial difficulties.

72

SIPA negates the risk of customer claims by requiring that the

securities and cash. See id. The SIPA trustee may use this money to replace lost
securities. See id. § 78fff-2(d) (1982). Yet the SIPA trustee may only do so if a
"fair and orderly market" exists for the securities in question. See id.
169. See id. § 78fff-2(b)(2) (1982) (mandating return of customer property); id.
§ 78111(2) (1982) (defining customer property to include securities deposited by an
agent); see also 1970 HousE REPORT, supra note 107, at 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5254, 5256 (Congress intended to protect owners of
securities held "for safekeeping"). A person who, as a principal or as an agent,
directs the insolvent to hold securities for safekeeping is a "customer." See 15
U.S.C. § 78111(2) (1982). Thus, acting through a "broker" does not destroy one's
customer status. Similarly, a customer includes one whose account is cleared by a
SIPC member on a fully disclosed basis for introducing brokers or dealers. See
17 C.F.R. § 300.200 (1986).
170. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 869 (amending Bankruptcy
Act of July 1, 1889 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 96(e)) (repealed by Bankruptcy Code
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2613); see also J. HENDERSON, REMINGTON
ON BANKRUPTCY §§ 2514-18 (2d ed. 1970); J. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 319-26 (1956) [hereinafter MACLACHLAN].
171. See MACLACHLAN, supra note 170, at 323 (pre-SIPA law adopted theory
that customers permitting stockbroker to exercise broad power over their securities
subjected themselves to risk of loss); 116 CONG. REC. H39343 (daily ed. Dec. 1,
1970) (remarks of Rep. Latta) (under bankruptcy law customers sometimes did not
recover full value of their securities); see id. at H39346 (statement of Rep. Staggers)
(same).
172. In general, the broker is liable as an agent or bailee of his customer. See
Southern Ohio Bank v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 479 F.2d 478,
481 (6th Cir. 1973); Gilman v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 93
Misc. 2d 941, 944, 404 N.Y.S.2d 258, 262 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
Since Congress passed SIPA, the SEC has promulgated complex rules to assure
that brokers maintain the physical possession or control of all securities a customer
has fully paid for and all securities in a margin account when the value of those
securities is greater than 1400o of the margin loan. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(b)
(1986). In addition, brokers who hold customers' funds pursuant to the trading
activity of those customers must deposit that cash in a "special reserve bank
account" to insure that the broker cannot use it. See id. § 240.15c3-3(e) (1986).
But these regulations expressly preserve a customer's pre-SIPA right to demand
cash or securities that he has fully paid for. See id. § 240.15c3-3(l) (1985).
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trustee for an insolvent holding broker return securities in the holding
broker's possession that belong to the customers of a depositing
broker. 73 Thus, SIPA frees depositing brokers from the possibility
that claims by their own customers for lost securities could cause
74

financial difficulty.
Similarly, SIPA protects a dealer who contracts to sell or purchase
securities to satisfy a customer order. 75 When enacting SIPA, Congress recognized that some brokers contract to sell or buy securities

at current market prices and provide that the securities need not
be physically transferred until a later "settlement date.' 1 76 Prior to
SIPA, if a broker relied upon a contract with a second broker to
satisfy a customer order, the SIPA trustee for the second broker

could choose to dishonor the contract if the second broker became
insolvent.177 At the point that the second broker breached, both the

applicable regulations 178 and the common law

79

required the first

173. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(b)(2) (1982) (requiring SIPA trustee to deliver
customer's securities to maximum extent possible); id. § 78111(4) (defining cus-

tomer to include agent); see also note 27 (broker acts as agent of investor).
In a transaction with a broker acting as a principal, however, a SIPA trustee
cannot use money advanced by SIPC to pay or guarantee debts, or to purchase
securities to restore the accounts of brokers unless those depositing brokers can
establish that, according to their books, they were acting on behalf of their own
customers. See id. § 78fff-3(a)(5) (1982).
174. See 1970 HousE REPORT, supra note 107, at 5, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5254, 5263; see also SIPC v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 415
(1975); SEC v. Aberdeen Sec. Co., 480 F.2d 1121 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S.

1111 (1973).
175. See 1970 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 107, at 8, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5254, 5263. "[T]he completion of such transactions will
be in the interest of the public as well as investors. It is designed to minimize the

disruption caused by a failure of a broker-dealer, precluding the domino effect of
such failure." Id.
176. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 116, at 226-27 (statement of Phillip
A. Loomis, General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission); see also SEC
v. Kelly, Andrews & Bradley, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 948, 953-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(Congress enacted SIPA's open contract provisions, 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(e) (1982),
to reflect industry practice and SEC policy regarding executory securities contracts).
177. See MACLACRLAN, supra note 170, at 174.
178. See SEC v. Kelly, Andrews & Bradley, Inc. 385 F. Supp 948, 953 n.23
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); see also N.Y. Stock Exchange Rule 293, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH)
2293 (1985); Exchange Act Release No. 9325 [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,302 (Sept. 7, 1972); Exchange Act Release No. 8825,
[1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,785 (Feb. 20, 1970);
Exchange Act Release No. 8601 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH)

77,708 (May 8, 1969).

179. See Lewis H. Ankeny, 29 S.E.C. 514, 516 (1949). A dealer impliedly
represents that the transaction entered into for a customer will be consummated
promptly unless there is a clear understanding to the contrary. See id.; see also
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broker to go out into the marketplace and complete the customer's

order even if the market price of the security had changed since
the customer had placed the order. If a broker did not complete a
customer's order, he was liable to the customer for any loss caused

either by an increase in the market price of securities that a customer
sought to buy'80 or a decrease in the price of securities that a
customer sought to sell.'8 ' Congress feared that such circumstances
could force small dealers into bankruptcy, resulting in a "domino
82
effect" that could cause the market to collapse.

Congress wanted to prevent such "failures to receive" and "failures
to deliver" from destabilizing the marketplace.8 3 Accordingly, SIPA
requires a SIPA trustee to complete these types of contracts between

the insolvent broker and another broker who is executing customer
orders. 8 4 In addition, SIPC can direct a trustee to complete any
Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1026 (6th Cir. 1979) (broker's
delay in executing sale is actionable under Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5).
180. See Galigher v. Jones, 129 U.S. 193, 199-201 (1889); McKinley v. Williams,
74 F. 94, 103 (8th Cir. 1896); In re Swift, 114 F. 947, 949 (D. Mass. 1902).
181. See Schultz v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 716 F.2d 136, 13940 (2d Cir. 1983); Clements v. Mueller, 41 F.2d 41, 42 (9th Cir. 1930); Fletcher
v. Cobuzzi, 510 F. Supp. 263, 264-66 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
182. See 1970 HOusE REPORT, supra note 107, at 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5254, 5263.

183. See id. Senator Muskie, a major proponent of an investor insurance program,
warned of the possibility of a major market disaster caused by a series of brokerdealers' failures, endangering the entire industry. Federal Broker-Dealer Insurance
Corporation: Hearings on S. 2348, S. 3988, and S. 3989 Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
39 (1970) (statement of Walter Latour, Senior Managing Partner, Francis I. DuPont
& Co.); id. at 36-37 (statement of John Leslie, Chairman of Board of Directors,
Bache & Co.).
184. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(e) (1982). SIPC has adopted rules for contractual
commitments which are outstanding on the filing date. See 17 C.F.R. § 300 (1986).
The rules provide that the contract will be performed: (1) if the broker-dealer
holding the outstanding contract was acting as an agent of a customer; or (2) if
the insolvent broker-dealer fails to maintain his records on a specific identification
basis and he had already transferred shares necessary to fill a firm customer order
in a manner consistent with the special reserve requirement of 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c(3)(3) (1986). See id. § 300.301 (1986).
Also, all such open contractual commitments must have a settlement date no
more than 30 days before the filing date, or up to 5 days after, as long as the
trade was made before the filing date. See id. Despite these regulations, SIPC may,
after consulting with the SEC, direct the trustee to complete any open contractual
commitment whatsoever in order to prevent a substantial detrimental effect on brokerdealers. See id. § 300.306. Also, with court approval, a trustee may, at any time,
complete an open contractual commitment entered into for the benefit of a customer
if this can be done with that customer's own securities in an account of the insolvent
broker-dealer. See 17 C.F.R. § 300.307.
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type of open contract whatsoever if such action is needed to "prevent
a substantial detrimental impact upon the financial condition of one
or more brokers or dealers." 18' 5
3.

Distribution of "Customer Property"

After the SIPA trustee uses all these methods to maximize the
number of securities and the cash in the customer property fund,
he then distributes the contents of that fund to customers.,8 6 If the
securities in the fund are insufficient to meet customer claims, the
trustee allocates the securities available on a pro-rata basis 8l 7 and
indemnifies each customer for up to an additional $500,000 worth
of securities and cash.'
SIPA does not indemnify customers for any loss in the market
value of securities that occurs after the filing date. 18 9 Instead, SIPA
protects customers from market fluctuations by holding their securities for delivery.' 9° SIPA protects customers by requiring SIPC
The broker-dealer whose contracts with the failed broker-dealer have been closed
out or completed must net profits and losses from those transactions. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78fff-2(e) (1982). Any net profit must be paid to the insolvent's estate, but if
there is a net loss, SIPC will advance cash to indemnify the broker-dealer f6r the
first $40,000 of each individual loss on a contract made on behalf of a customer.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(3) (1982). If no customer is involved, the broker-dealer is
treated as an unsecured creditor of the general estate. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(e)
(1982).
185. See 17 C.F.R. § 300.306.
186. See id. § 78fff-2(b) (1982).
187. See id. § 78fff-2(b)(2).
188. See id. § 78fff-3(a) (1982). The money is made available whether or not
the debtor's estate is sufficient to reimburse SIPC. See id. § 78fff-2(b)(1). Advances
are limited to $500,000 for cash and securities in each customer's account, of
which no more than $100,000 can be cash. See id. § 78fff-3(a)(1). For the purposes
of this limit, securities are valued as of the time the SIPA petition is filed. See
id. § 78fff-2(b).
189. See id. § 78fff(b) (1982) (SIPA values customer securities as of date SIPA
petition is filed); see also SEC v. Aberdeen Sec. Co., 480 F.2d 1121, 1124 n.3
(3d Cir. 1973) (noting that problems caused by any loss in value between filing
date and payment of claim should be solved by legislature, rather than courts);
In re Weis Sec., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,861 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1976) (investors who make claims for relief
other than return of cash or securities are compensated as general creditors after
"customer property" is distributed).
190. See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 25, at 4 (SIPA does not subject
investors to the risk that the value of their securities will fluctuate by preventing
them from making investment decisions until their claims are paid by trustee); 1978
SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 764, 765 (principle underlying purpose of SIPA is to permit customer to
receive securities rather than cash; this enables customer to pursue his investment
objectives without being disturbed by forced sale of securities); See 1977 HousE
REPORT, supra note 157, at 4 (same).
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to advance money to a trustee. That money allows a trustee to: (1)

buy securities needed to restore customers accounts to the position
they should have been in at insolvency;1 9' and (2) pay or guarantee
192
debts if doing so will free customer securities from liens.

V.

The Sale/Loan Controversy in SIPA

SIPA was enacted to protect investors. 93 Congress recognized that
a broker is sometimes free to use his customer's securities' 94 and his

customer's money. 195 Therefore, courts administering SIPA proceedings should analyze the sale/loan question according to the practical
effects on customers of adopting each classification, both when the
insolvent issued the REPO with his customer's securities, and when
the insolvent bought the REPO using his customer's money.
A.

The REPO Transaction as a Contract for a Sale and a

Subsequent Repurchase Under SIPA
If the court considers a REPO transaction a contract for sale and
subsequent repurchase, then during the time between the sale and
repurchase, the REPO participants are bound only by their duties
under the contract. 196 The REPO issuer has an obligation to return
securities, 197 and the REPO buyer is obligated to repurchase the
191. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(d) (1982); see also 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra
note 25, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 764, 765 (central
feature of SIPA is grant of authority to trustee to purchase securities in open
market or otherwise obtain them for purpose of restoring customer accounts to
their filing date positions, allowing trustee to satisfy customer claims by delivering
securities); see id. at 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 764,
776 (to increase extent to which customer claims for securities are satisfied with
securities rather than cash, SIPA authorizes SIPA trustee to compensate for missing
securities by purchasing shares).
192. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-l(b)(2) (1982); see also 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra
note 25, at 13 ("recovery of securities given ... as collateral for loans is an

important means of facilitating the delivery of securities to customers").
193. See 1970 HousE REPORT, supra note 107, at 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5254, 5255; see also 1970 House Hearings, supra note 116,
at 115 (statement of Hon. Hammer Budge, Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission).
194. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 116, at 150-51 (statement of Hon. Hammer Budge, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Comission); see also 1970 HousE
REPORT, supra note 107, at 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5254, 5256 (use of customers' securities is limited by regulations).
195. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 116, at 150 (statement of Hon. Hammer
Budge, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission); see also 1970 HousE
REPORT, supra note 107, at 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5254, 5256.
196. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
197. See Gilmore v. State Bd. of Admin., 382 So. 2d at 862-63; see also First
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securities.19 The REPO buyer who purchased securities in good faith

owns those securities. 199
1.

The REPO Issuer's Insolvency Under the Sale View
If the REPO issuer becomes bankrupt between the sale and the

repurchase, the risk to his customers is that the REPO buyer will
breach.200 A REPO buyer might be tempted to breach its contractual

obligation to return securities if the underlying securities become
more valuable than the price that the REPO issuer will pay upon
repurchase, the risk to his customers is that the REPO buyer will
and protects the REPO issuer's customers who own the securities
involved.
If a REPO buyer fails to return the securities or their value, SIPA
allows a trustee to bring an action for breach of contract 20 ' and use
any recovery to compensate customers. 202 In a breach of contract

action, courts value securities at their highest market price between
the time that they should have been delivered and the time it would
take a reasonable buyer to purchase replacement securities.20 3 Damages for the breach, therefore, could not be cheaper but might be
more expensive than the value of the securities on the repurchase
Nat'l Bank v. Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d 668, 670 (5th Cir. 1981) (REPO buyer
obligated to deliver securities of like kind on specified date).
198. See In re Financial Corp., 1 Bankr. 522, 525 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Miller v.
Schweickart, 413 F. Supp. 1062, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see also Estate of Russell,
657 F.2d 668, 672 (5th Cir. 1981) (repayment not conditional).
199. See In re Legel, Braswell Gov't Sec., Corp., 648 F.2d 321, 328-30 (5th Cir.
1981). A bona fide purchaser of underlying securities in a REPO transaction takes
title to those securities clear of all adverse claims. See id.; Cosmopolitan Credit
& Inv. Corp. v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 507 F. Supp. 954, 958 (S.D. Fla.
1981).
200. See Gilmore v. State Bd. of Admin., 382 So. 2d 861, 862 (REPO buyer
defaulted when REPO issuer became bankrupt); SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. at
470 n.24 (risk of dishonor noted); STIOUM, supra note 55, at 25.
201. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-1 (1982). A SIPA trustee has the powers of a
bankruptcy trustee. See id. A bankruptcy trustee can commence and prosecute any
action or proceeding on behalf of the estate before any tribunal. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 323 (1982); BANK. R. 6009; 2 COLLIER, supra note 4, 323.02[4].
202. See 15 U.S.C. § 78111(4)(D) (1982). Customer property includes the proceeds
of customer property transferred by the insolvent broker. See id. The insolvent
broker's estate also owns any right of action the broker may have had under a
contract. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982); 4 COLLIER, supra note 4,
541.10. The
REPO buyer, however, can offset damages by the amount of the repurchase payment.
See 11 U.S.C. § 546(0 (Supp. III 1985).
203. See generally Galigher v. Jones, 129 U.S. 193, 199-201 (1889); Schultz v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 716 F.2d 136, 140-41 (2d Cir. 1983); Clements
v. Mueller, 41 F.2d 41, 42 (9th Cir. 1930); In re Swift, 114 F. 947, 949 (D. Mass.
1902). See Financial Corp., 1 Bankr. at 524-25 (damages for failure to execute a
REPO contract governed by law of contracts).
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date. 204 Thus, any rise in the market value of underlying securities
that might otherwise have encouraged a REPO buyer to breach his
contract would instead provide incentive for the REPO buyer to
honor his contract.
Therefore, when a REPO issuer becomes insolvent, customers who
own securities that the REPO issuer used to issue the REPO will
(at least in theory) receive their securities back. If the REPO buyer
honors the REPO contract, the SIPA trustee for the REPO issuer
distributes those securities to customers. 20 5 If the REPO buyer dishonors the REPO contract, the SIPA trustee can bring an action
against the REPO buyer for breach of contract, and use any recovery
to buy replacement securities. 2°6 Thus, SIPA protects the REPO
issuer's customers if the sale view is adopted.
2.

The REPO Buyer's Insolvency Under the Sale View

Conversely, if it is the REPO buyer that becomes insolvent between
the time of the sale and the time of the repurchase, customers of
the REPO issuer are protected. One section of the Bankruptcy Code
should be incorporated into SIPA because it is consistent with SIPA's
policy of preventing market collapse. Section 546(f) of the Bankruptcy
Code prohibits a SIPA trustee from breaching the REPO contract
when his only motivation is that the market value of underlying
securities has become greater than the repurchase price. The Bankruptcy
Code prohibits a breach by requiring the SIPA trustee for a REPO
buyer to accept repurchase payments from a good faith REPO issuer," '
and by prohibiting the SIPA trustee from preventing the REPO issuer
from making such payments." 8 The SIPA trustee for the REPO buyer
can avoid accepting a repurchase payment only if the REPO participants entered into the REPO transactions intending to defraud
creditors. 09
In addition to the protection afforded by the Bankruptcy Code,
the open contract provisions in SIPA protect customers of the REPO
204. If the price declined since the delivery date, the REPO issuer would recover
the highest market price between the delivery date and a reasonable time to replace.
Thus, the issuer would recover the market price as of the time of the delivery
date, and if the price rose during the period, the REPO issuer would be entitled
to recover a greater amount. See Schultz, 716 F.2d at 140-41.
205. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c) (1982).
206. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
207. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(f) (Supp. III 1985).
208. See id. § 362(b)(7) (Supp. III 1985).
209. See id. § 546(f) (Supp. III 1985); id § 548(a)(1); 4 COLLIER, supra note 4,
548.09[3], at 548-117.
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issuer. SIPA regulations direct a SIPA trustee for the REPO buyer

to honor certain types of open contractual commitments with the
REPO issuer. 210 Those regulations define the term "open contractual
commitment" narrowly, 21 but also provide that the SIPA trustee

must complete contracts that fail to conform to the regulatory
definition, if completion will "prevent a substantial detrimental im-

pact upon the financial condition of one or more brokers or dealers." 21 2
Through this provision, Congress created a safety net which can be
used to prevent the collapse of the marketplace when a holding
broker files for bankruptcy and is unable to return securities as it
3
should.

21

Congress enacted the open contract provisions so that the financial
resources of a depositing broker would not be drained either: (1)
by his attempt to replace the deposited securities owned by his

customers; or (2) by lawsuits brought by his customers based on
his failure to make such replacements. 2 4 Therefore, under the sale
view, both the Bankruptcy Code and SIPA protect the REPO issuer's
customers when the REPO buyer becomes insolvent.
In 1986, a United States District Court in New Jersey held that

a REPO is a contract for a sale and a subsequent repurchase for
the purposes of SIPA.21 5 The court in In re Bevill, Bressler &
Schulman Asset Management Corp. went even one step further,
however, classifying a REPO participant as a SIPA "customer." 2'1 6
The Bevill court's classification thwarts congressional intent and
210. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 300.300 to -.307 (1986).
211. See id. § 300.300(c) (1986). Open contracts are contracts in which two
brokers have obligated themselves to transfer securities, but neither side has performed-The seller has not tendered the securities, and the buyer has not tendered
the purchase price. See id. § 300.300(a)-(c).
212. See id. § 300.306 (1986). SIPC is required to consult with the SEC, however,
before it determines that a contract that does not comply with the regulatory
definition should be completed. See id.
213. See Federal Broker Dealer Insurance Corporation: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st

Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1970) (statement of John Leslie, Chairman, Bache & Co.)
[hereinafter 1970 Senate Hearings]; id. at 257 (statement of Hon. Hammer Budge,
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission); id. at 142 (statement of Sen.

Edmund Muskie); 1970 HousE REPORT, supra note 107, at 9, reprinted in 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5254, 5263; see also SEC v. Kelly, Andrews

& Bradley, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 948, 952 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Note, Securities

Investor Protection Act, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 136 (1974).

214. See Kelly, Andrews & Bradley, 385 F. Supp. at 952; 1970 Senate Hearings
supra note 213, at 147 (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
215. See In re Bevill, Bressler & Schulman Asset Management Corp., [Current

Vol.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
216. Id. at 94,738.

92,966, at 94,736 (Oct. 23, 1986).
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threatens to deplete the assets of SIPC. When Congress enacted
SIPA, it intended to protect individual investors by affording them
preferential status.21 7 Many REPO participants are institutions such
as dealers."' Therefore, if a court allows REPO participants to
qualify as customers, it works against the intent of Congress by
21 9
protecting dealers rather than individual investors.
220
Similarly, SIPA works by distributing securities to customers.
If a court considers a REPO participant a SIPA customer, REPO
participants will receive securities from an insolvent broker's customer
property fund.2 2 ' These distributions will drain first the insolvent
broker's customer property fund,2 22 and next the assets of SIPC. 223
B.

The REPO Transaction as a Loan Under SIPA

If a court considers a REPO transaction a contract for a sale
and a subsequent repurchase, only one participant owns the underlying securities at any one time. But, if a court considers a REPO
a loan, both participants own interests in the securities. If a REPO
is a loan, both parties have an ownership interest because the
underlying securities are collateral. 224 Although collateral ultimately
belongs to the REPO issuer, it is encumbered by the REPO buyer's
security interest. 225 The question of which party will get that collateral,
217. See SEC v. Kenneth Bove & Co., 378 F. Supp. 697, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(Congress intended to afford SIPA customers relief akin to preference given to
reclamation claim in traditional bankruptcies); see also SIPC v. Executive Sec.
Corp., 556 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1977) (SIPA affords "customers" preferential
status).
218. Snow, supra note 53, at 12-19; Bankruptcy Reform: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 311
(statement of Peter D. Sternlight, Executive Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank
of New York) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Reform Hearings]; The Issuance of Retail
Repurchase Agreements by Banks and Savings and Loan Asiociations, Exchange
Act Release No. 18,122, [Vol. 2] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2024, at 2559-4 (Sept.
25, 1981) [hereinafter Retail REPOs].
219. See infra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
220. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(a)(l)(B) (1982); 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 25,
at 4 (statement of Harold M. Williams, Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission); 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 764, 765.
221. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
222. See infra notes 321-25 and accompanying text.
223. See infra notes 304-08 and accompanying text.
224. See Need for Legislative Action, supra note 10, at 829 n.8; Mitchell, supra
note 10, at 6, col. 1; Portnoy, supra note 10, at 19, col. 2.
225. See In re Legel, Braswell Gov't Sec., Corp., 648 F.2d 321, 324-26 (5th Cir.
1981); Cosmopolitan Credit & Inv. Corp. v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 507
F. Supp. 954, 956-58 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Portnoy, supra note 10, at 19, col. 2.
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therefore, depends upon whether SIPA allows a secured creditor to
keep collateral and, if so, whether the REPO issuer can defeat the
REPO buyer's security interest. The answers to these questions, in
turn, depend upon which REPO participant has become insolvent
and when that insolvency has occurred.
If a court considers a REPO transaction a loan, and either party
becomes insolvent, SIPA may subject the REPO participant and the
REPO participant's customers to three risks: (1) the risk of fluctuation in the market price of underlying securities; 226 (2) the risk
of losing possession of the securities; 227 causing (3) the22 risk of not
having the anticipated numbers of securities available. 1
1.

The REPO Buyer's Insolvency Under the Loan View

Under the loan view, the REPO buyer holds collateral to secure
repayment of the repurchase price. 229 If the REPO buyer becomes
bankrupt between the sale and the repurchase, the REPO issuer
could lose his interest in the collateral.23 ° Upon the REPO buyer's
bankruptcy, the REPO issuer is clearly protected by the Bankruptcy
Code, but the REPO issuer may be at risk under SIPA.
Upon insolvency, the Bankruptcy Code would classify underlying
securities as "cash collateral. '23 1 The Code forbids a trustee to use
or sell cash collateral unless he meets one of two conditions. The
trustee must either: (1) obtain consent from the party in interest,
in this case the REPO issuer; 23 2 or (2) convince the court that the
REPO issuer will be adequately protected after the use or sale. 233
Courts will consider a creditor adequately protected only if the trustee
2 34
gives him the "indubitable equivalence" of his interest in property.
For example, a bankruptcy trustee could adequately protect a lienholder by giving him a replacement lien on other property of the
235
estate.
226. See infra notes 244-53 and accompanying text.

227. See infra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
228. See infra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
230. See infra notes 236-41 and accompanying text.
231. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1982). "Cash Collateral" includes securities in which
the estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest. Id.
232. See id. § 363(c)(2)(A) (1982).
233. See id. § 363(c)(2)(B) (1982). Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code gives
examples of the kinds of arrangments that provide adequate protection. See 11
U.S.C. § 361 (1982); see also In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426,
361.01, at 361-5.
428 (9th Cir. 1984); 2 COLLIER, supra note 4,
234. See In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935) (Learned
Hand, J.).

235. See, e.g., In re American Kitchen Foods, Inc., 9 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d
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When a SIPA trustee liquidates a REPO buyer, however, SIPA

might not protect customers of the REPO issuer to the same degree
that they are protected by the Bankruptcy Code. SIPA creates a
class of creditors called "customers" whose claims enjoy priority
over the claims of bankruptcy creditors. 23 6 SIPA empowers a trustee

to use property of the insolvent broker to purchase securities that
the insolvent failed to hold for its "customers. ' 23 7 Therefore, if the
REPO buyer failed to possess or control securities as required, a
SIPA trustee may be able to use cash collateral, specifically securities

underlying a REPO transaction, to satisfy customer claims.
For example, a broker is required to hold securities for which
customers have fully paid. 238 Assume that a broker speculates with
his customers' securities and loses them. He may try to replace the
lost securities temporarily by purchasing securities through a REPO
transaction. Assume further that the broker subsequently became
insolvent while holding the securities subject to the REPO. Since a
SIPA trustee can use the assets of a bankrupt REPO buyer's estate
to replace securities that the REPO buyer failed to hold for his
customers, 23 9 and since, under the loan view, the REPO buyer's

estate has an ownership interest in the underlying securities, 240 a
SIPA trustee may be able to use the securities underlying the REPO

24
transaction to satisfy the claims of the REPO buyer's customers. 1

(MB) 537, 538-49 (N.D. Me. 1976); In re Blazon Flexible Flyer, Inc., 407 F. Supp.
861, 864-65 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
236. See SIPC v. Executive Sec. Corp., 423 F. Supp. 94, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
SEC v. Kenneth Bove & Co., 378 F. Supp. 697, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
237. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78111(4)(A) (1982). The SIPA trustee can use the customer
property fund to purchase necessary securities in a fair and orderly market. Id.
§ 78fff-2(d). Customer property includes that property of the insolvent broker which
is needed to cover shortfalls in customer accounts caused by the insolvent broker's
failure to comply with the applicable financial responsibility requirements of 15
U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3), and its attendant regulations. See id. § 78111(4)(A).
238. See id. § 78o(c)(3) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(b)(1) (1986).
239. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3. Section 15(c) of the Securities and Exchange
Act requires brokers to comply with financial responsibility rules regarding the
custody and use of customers' securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (1982). The
applicable regulations require brokers to possess or control all securities that customers have fully paid for. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(b)(I) (1986). SIPA allows
a SIPA trustee to use a broker's assets to compensate the customer property fund
for any shortfall due to the broker's non-compliance with the above regulations.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78111(4) (1982). Using this money, a SIPA trustee can purchase
securities needed to restore customer accounts to the positions they should have
been in at insolvency. See § 78fff-2(d) (1982).
240. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982); see also supra note 65 and accompanying
text. But see 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982) (limiting SIPA trustee's right to use "cash
collateral" under provisions of the Bankruptcy Code).
241. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.

FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. XV

In such situations, a REPO issuer's customers who own the securities could make claims only as bankruptcy creditors. 242 They
would be satisfied out of the bankrupt broker's estate only after
2 43
claims of all the REPO buyer's customers had been satisfied.
Therefore, if a court adopts the loan view, customers of REPO
issuers could lose their securities when a REPO buyer becomes

insolvent.
2.

The REPO Issuer's Insolvency Under the Loan View

Similarly, when it is the REPO issuer who becomes insolvent
during the time between the sale and the repurchase, the SIPA
trustee must avoid repurchasing the securities from the REPO buyer

if their market value has diminished, but complete the REPO transaction if their market value has increased.
Under the loan view,
when a REPO issuer pays the repurchase price and receives the
underlying securities, he is paying his debt and recovering collateral. 245 SIPA does not allow a trustee to pay a debt unless doing
246
so would free securities that are worth more than the payment.
Therefore, when the market value of the underlying securities fluctuates, the insolvent REPO issuer's estate cannot lose and the REPO
buyer cannot win. The REPO buyer must honor the REPO contract
when the value of the securities he is holding has increased, but

must keep the securities if their value is diminishing.
Additionally, as the value of the collateral securities diminishes
and a greater portion of the issuer's debt becomes unsecured, SIPA
prevents the REPO buyer from immediately cutting his losses by
242. See infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
243. See In re Weis Sec., Inc., [1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,681 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1976); SEC v. Horizon Sec., Inc., No. 72-5112,
(S.D.N.Y., May 31, 1974) (quoted in SEC v. Kenneth Bove & Co., Inc., 378 F.
Supp. 697, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)).
244. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-l(b)(2) (1982). Section 546(f) of the Bankruptcy Code
provides that a SIPA trustee cannot avoid a payment for a REPO transaction.
See 11 U.S.C. § 546(f) (Supp. III 1982). In contrast, SIPA prohibits a SIPA trustee
from paying a debt unless the market value of the collateral is greater than the
money due. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-l(b)(2) (1982). SIPA trustees wield only those
bankruptcy powers consistent with SIPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-l(b) (1982). Therefore, SIPA trustees cannot redeem securities underlying a REPO unless their value
is greater than the repurchase price.
245. See United States v. Erickson, 601 F.2d 296, 300 n.4 (7th Cir. 1979); SEC
v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Mitchell, supra note 10, at 6,
col. 1.
246. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-l(b)(2) (1982); see also 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra
note 25, at 12, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 764, 775;
1978 HousE REPORT, supra note 107, at 22.
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foreclosing and selling the collateral. 247 SIPA's automatic stay prohibits a creditor from transferring any property in which the debtor's
estate has an interest. 248 To defeat the stay, a creditor must delay
liquidation and show that he cannot adequately protect his interests
unless he is allowed to transfer the property. 249 Since SIPA was
designed to avoid liquidating securities,' 50 and since Congress specifically decided to subject securities underlying REPO transactions
in SIPA proceedings to the automatic stay,'25' a court might refuse

to read SIPA to incorporate a section of the Bankruptcy Code that
allows REPO buyers to liquidate. 25 2 In any case, the market rate
of the collateral could continue to drop while the application is
53

made.21

In addition to losing equity, a REPO buyer might also lose
possession of the underlying securities. Under the loan view, a trustee
for a REPO issuer might recover the underlying securities without
repaying the loan. A trustee can recover the securities either if the
REPO buyer fails to perfect his security interest,' 5 4 or if the SIPA
247. Although § 559 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a REPO buyer's
right to liquidate cannot be stayed under the Code, see 11 U.S.C. § 559 (Supp.
III 1985), that prohibition does not apply to stays under SIPA. See id.
248. See id. Filing a SIPA application pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(3) operates
as a stay under section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)
(1982). The SIPA stay does not, however, prevent a REPO buyer from setting off
a margin payment. See id. § 362(b)(7) (Supp. III 1985).
249. See id. § 362(d)(1) (1982). The Code requires a hearing to determine whether
a creditor's interest is adequately protected. See id. § 362(d); see also id. § 361
(1982) (examples of adequate protection). But see id. § 102(l)(B) (1982) (hearing
need not be held if party in interest fails to make a timely request or if there is
insufficient time); id. § 362(f) (Supp. III 1985) (court can grant relief from stay
without hearing to prevent irreparable damage to interest in property).
250. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-l(b)(l) (1982); 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 25,
at 4 (statement of Harold Williams, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission); 1977 HouSE REPORT, supra note 159, at 21.
251. See 11 U.S.C. § 559 (Supp. III 1985); see also 1983 Senate Hearings, supra
note 99, at 326-36 (statement of Peter Sternlight, Executive Vice President, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York).
252. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b) (1982). The Bankruptcy Code is applicable to a
SIPA proceeding only to the extent that it is consistent with SIPA. See id.
253. See, e.g., Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 473. A REPO participant with highly
leveraged positions is subject to risk in the rapidly moving REPO market. See id.
at 474.
254. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1982). If a REPO buyer fails to perfect within ten
days a court would deem the underlying securities transferred not when the underlying
securities change hands, but when the REPO buyer perfects. See id. § 547(e)(2)
(1982). Since the REPO buyer pays the REPO issuer cash when the securities
change hands, if the REPO buyer fails to perfect, a SIPA trustee can avoid the
REPO as a transfer for an antecedent debt-the earlier cash payment. See id.
§ 544(b) comment 1; see supra note 147. The steps necessary for perfection are
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trustee can convince a court that he can adequately protect the REPO
buyer's interest when he uses or sells securities."' As discussed above,
Congress designed SIPA to allow a trustee to use all the insolvent
broker's assets necessary to satisfy customer claims before the trustee
satisfies the claims of any other creditors. 2 6 Therefore, REPO buyers
would be hard pressed to argue that adequately protecting their
257
interest should take priority over satisfying the claims of customers.
If the REPO buyer fails to prove that he has a perfected security

interest in the underlying securities, or if a trustee can show that
the REPO buyer will nonetheless be adequately protected, a trustee
can force the REPO buyer to turn underlying securities over to
him. 258 Then the REPO buyer will be unable to use the securities
for the purpose that prompted him to enter into the REPO trans-

action, and he may be forced to borrow securities to replace those
lost-which in turn would force him to incur additional cost. The
governed by state U.C.C. law. See In re Spectra Prism Indus., 8 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 2d (MB) 325 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983). In addition, a SIPA trustee may avoid
transactions voidable under state law. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982). Therefore, the
SIPA trustee could avoid a REPO under either § 544 or § 547.
State U.C.C. law, however, differs from state to state. See generally Kraemer,
supra note 148, at 23 (P.L.I. 1985).
255. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1982) (SIPA trustee can use or sell cash collateral
if trustee convinces court that creditor will be adequately protected); id. § 542(a) (SIPA
trustee can force creditor to turn over property that SIPA trustee may use or
sell under Bankruptcy Code). A SIPA trustee can use the Bankruptcy Code to
force a REPO buyer to turn over collateral that the estate can use, sell, or lease.
See id. A SIPA trustee can use, sell, or lease assets that are property of the estate.
See id. § 363(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985). A court would consider securities underlying
a REPO transaction to be a special type of estate property-"cash collateral." See
id. § 363(a) (Supp. III 1985). A SIPA trustee must obtain the court's permission
before it uses cash collateral. See id. § 363(c)(2)(B) (1982). A court will only allow
a SIPA trustee to use cash collateral if the REPO buyer's interest will be adequately
protected. See id. § 363(o)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
256. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
257. See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982). Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code gives
examples of what constitutes adequate protection. In re American Mariner Indus.,
734 F.2d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing 2 COLLIER, supra note 4, 361.01[4]).
Bankruptcy courts, however, are courts of equity and would balance the potential
hardship to the REPO issuers customers against hardship for a broker. See 2
361.01[4]. In addition, even if a court finds that a REPO
COLLIER, supra note 4,
issuer would not be adequately protected as required by section 361 of the Bankruptcy
Code, the court could find that section 361 is inconsistent with SIPA's requirement
of satisfying the claims of customers first, and refuse to incorporate that section
into SIPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b) (1982).
258. See 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1982). The REPO buyer must prove that he has
a valid security interest, see id. § 363(o)(2) (Supp. III 1985), but the SIPA trustee
can nonethless recover the property if he can convince a court that the REPO
buyer will remain adequately protected, see id., § 363(o)(1), or that a REPO buyer
need not be adequately protected in a SIPA proceeding. See supra notes 250-52.
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REPO buyer can avoid losing both the repurchase payment and the
costs of borrowing replacement securities only if he reclaims the
securities as a SIPA customer.259

3.

The REPO Participantas a SIPA Customer
The SIPA definition of "customer" includes those who, personally

or through a broker acting as their agent, maintain accounts containing "securities ' 26 0 that the debtor receives, acquires or holds in
one of three ways: (1) with a view to sale or pursuant to purchase;
(2) for safekeeping; or (3) as collateral security. 26' Therefore, to
qualify as a customer, a REPO buyer must show that the transaction

involved "securities"; 2 62 and that, in the transaction, he acted as an
agent of one of his investors. 263 Only a customer can retrieve securities

264
entrusted to the debtor.
First, a court should not characterize a REPO, itself, as a "security" as that term is defined by SIPA. 265 Only the underlying
securities can qualify under SIPA's definition. 266 When it amended

the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, Congress last considered how to
characterize a REPO transaction. 267 Because SIPA's definition of

"security" is virtually identical to the definition of "security" under
the Bankruptcy Code, 261 Congress' actions shed light on whether it
259. See 15 U.S.C. § 78111(2) (1982).
260. See id. § 78111(14) (1982).

261. See id. § 78111(2); see also id. § 78fff-3(a)(5) (1982) (SIPC cannot advance money to pay claims of broker except those rising out of transactions
with customers).
262. See infra notes 265-74 and accompanying text.
263. See SEC v. Seggos & Co., 416 F. Supp. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (securities
must be "entrusted" to insolvent broker in order for owner to qualify as customer);
SEC v. Bove & Co., 378 F. Supp. 697, 699 (SD.N.Y. 1974) (same).
264. See SIPC v. Executive Sec. Corp., 423 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd,
556 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. F.O. Baroff Co., 497 F.2d 280, 282-84
(2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Investors Sec. Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 95,801 (W.D. Pa. June 17, 1976).
265. See Retail REPOs, supra note 218, at 2559-64; see also Lifting the Cloud,
supra note 94, at 418-19 (discussing adverse consequences of courts treating REPO
transactions as separate securities under Exchange Act).
266. See 15 U.S.C. § 78111(4) (Supp. 1 1983). Underlying securities could qualify
as SIPA "securities" if they are notes, stocks, treasury stocks, bonds, debentures
or evidences of indebtedness. Id. The REPO itself might only qualify if a court
considers the REPO to be an investment contract, but investment contracts do not
qualify as SIPC securities unless they are registered under the Exchange Act. See
id.
267. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
268. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78111(14) (Supp. 1 1983) (SIPA definition of a security)
with 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (1982) (Bankruptcy Code definition of a security).
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intended courts to treat REPO transactions as securities under
SIPA.
Congress declined to treat a REPO as a security for the purposes
of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that apply to stockbrokers
who are not members of SIPA. 269 Congress handled REPO transactions by creating a new statutory framework applied only to those
instruments.2 70 The framework paralleled the treatment of "securities
contracts, '271 and, in fact, Congress anticipated that when a REPO
fails to fit into the REPO sections, it could be treated under the
272
securities contract sections.
Congress designed both the REPO and security contract sections
to allow dealers to protect themselves from fluctuating market prices
in transactions with other dealers.2 73 Congress believed that allowing
dealers to take these protective measures would avoid a series of market
failures when a dealer who has open securities positions with other
dealers becomes bankrupt.2 74 In short, Congress created a new statutory
mechanism rather than treating REPO transactions and other interdealer transactions as securities under the stockbroker provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to treat
REPOs as "securities" under SIPA.
Similarly, in these types of inter-dealer transactions, the REPO
participants are not acting on behalf of their customers, but are
raising capital for their own needs. 275 REPO transactions, therefore,
276
lack the type of fiduciary characteristics that SIPA safeguards.
269. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 761-766 (1982).
270. See 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 98, at 323 (submission of Peter J.
Sternlight, Executive Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York); Levin
& Donovan, supra note 30, at 154.
271. See S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (REPO sections added to
clarify that REPOs are to be treated as under Pub. L. No. 97-222, which proscribed
treatment for securities contracts); see also 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 25,
at 328-29, 322-23, 335 (stating that proposed REPO amendments build upon Pub.
L. No. 97-222).
272. See 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 99, at 324 (statement of Peter J.
Sternlight, Executive Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
273. See 4 COLLIER, supra note 4, 741.07, at 741-50; see also 128 CONG. REC.
S8133 (daily ed. July 13, 1982) (statement of Sen. Dole) [hereinafter Dole statement].
274. See H. REP. No. 420, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982); Dole statement, supra
note 270, at S8133.
275. See SEC v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 295, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
rev'd on other grounds, 785 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2894 (1986);
see also SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (government securities
dealers use cash provided by REPO transactions to finance their holdings); SEC
v. Executive Sec. Corp., 423 F. Supp. 94, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (benefit of REPOlike loan of securities is broker's ability to invest money acquired), aff'd, 556 F.2d
98 (2d Cir. 1977); STIGUM, supra note 56, at 416-18.
276. See 15 U.S.C. § 78111(2) (1982). The Second Circuit has interpreted SIPA
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Instead, REPO transactions display the characteristics of arms length
financial dealings which SIPA does not protect. 21 For these reasons,
REPO participants cannot qualify as customers under SIPA.
VI.

The Legislative Purpose of SIPA Requires that REPO
Transactions be Treated as Contracts for a Sale
and a Subsequent Repurchase

The argument that a REPO transaction is a loan, 271 therefore,

allows a SIPA trustee to add the underlying securities to the insolvent's estate if it is profitable to do so,279 but to avoid indemnifying
the owners of securities underlying a REPO transaction. 2 0 It is true

that the loan approach works to maximize the insolvent's estate,
lessening the possibility of a need to use SIPC funds and decreasing
the risk that the insolvent's customers will lose securities.211 It does
so, however, only by risking harm to the marketplace, increasing
the risk that REPO participants will be rendered insolvent 28 2 and
as stressing protection to and equality of treatment of the public customer who
has entrusted securities to a broker for some purpose related to participation in
the securities markets. See Baroff, 497 F.2d 280, 283 (2d Cir. 1974). Subsequently,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that
in connection with a secured loan, "the mere receipt of money in return for the
use of securities does not provide the requisite connection . . . [to] trading activity"
to constitute a SIPA customer. SIPC v. Executive Sec. Corp., 423 F. Supp. 94,
98 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). On appeal, the Second Circuit cited Baroff, and held that
because the debtor retained the contractual right to demand additional cash from
the creditor if the securities used as collateral rose in value, the transaction did
not bear the indicia of the fidicuary relationship between a broker and his public
customer. See SIPC v. Executive Sec. Corp. 556 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1977); see
also 4 COLLIER, supra note 4,
741.02, at 741-10. REPO transactions provide for
this type of insulation from market risk by allowing the REPO issuer to substitute
different collateral, see supra note 87 and accompanying text, and by allowing the
REPO buyer to liquidate collateral securities as long as he returns securities of the
same issue and series to the REPO issuer. See supra note 88 and accompanying
text.
277. See Executive Sec. Corp., 556 F.2d at 99; Baroff, 497 F.2d at 284; 4
COLLIER, supra note 4,
741.02, at 741-16.
278. See SIPC Amicus Memorandum, supra note 43, at 8-9 (SIPC argues
"[a]lthough structured in apparent terms of purchase and sale, the [REPO] transaction is in reality a short-term loan").
279. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
280. In the ESM case, the SIPC argued that REPO participants are not "customers" under the Bankruptcy Code's stockbroker provisions, which are virtually
identical to SIPA. See SIPC Amicus Memorandum, supra note 43, at 8. The SIPC
also argued that even if REPO participants are considered "customers" under the
Bankruptcy Code, they should not be considered "customers" under SIPA. See
id. at 24-27.
281. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
282. See infra notes 291-96 and accompanying text.
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causing investors to lose their securities or cash. 283 Therefore, the
loan view frustrates the secondary aims of SIPA while the sale view
advances those secondary aims.
Courts determining how to treat REPO transactions in the SIPA
context would do well to heed the comments of the Second Circuit
24
in S.E.C. v. F.O. Baroff Co.: 1

Judge Learned Hand has vividly admonished us not to be caught
in the trap of language which seems, literally, too broad or too
narrow to accommodate the patent legislative purposes. Securities
legislation is no exception. This court has already heeded the
28 5
caution in reading ... the Securities Investor Protection Act.
Classifying a REPO transaction as a contract for sale and subsequent
repurchase will most effectively accomplish the goals Congress intended to achieve in enacting SIPA.
A.

The Aims of SIPA
Congress intended SIPA: (1) to protect the market from a series

of insolvencies among broker-dealers; 28 6 (2) to protect a customer's
right to receive securities for which he paid in full; 28 7 and (3) to

28
increase the general public's confidence in the securities industry.
Courts can advance those goals by treating REPO transactions as
contracts for a sale and a subsequent repurchase, but refusing to
treat REPO participants as SIPA customers. 2 9 Such a classification

283. See supra notes 239-43 and accompanying text.
284. 497 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1974).
285. See id. at 282.
286. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 116, at 226 (testimony of Philip Loomis,
General Counsel, Securities & Exchange Commission); see also 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 213, at 39 (statement of Wallace LaTour, Senior Managing Partner,
Francis I. DuPont & Co.); id. at 36 (statement of John Leslie, Chairman, Bache
& Co.); 1970 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 107, at 9, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5254, 5263.
287. See 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 213, at 9 (statement of Hon. Hammer
Budge, Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission); see also 1978 House Hearings, supra note 237, at 228 (testimony of Phillip Loomis, General Counsel, Securities
& Exchange Commission); 1970 HousE REPORT, supra note 107, at 3, reprinted in
1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5254, 5256.
288. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 116, at 11 (statement of Hon. Hammer
Budge, Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission); 1970 HousE REPORT, supra
note 107, at 5, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5257; see
also SIPC v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 415 (1975) (Congress enacted SIPA to restore
investor confidence in the securities markets); SEC v. Ambassador Church Fin./
Dev. Group, Inc., 679 F.2d 608, 612 (6th Cir. 1982) (same), cert. denied sub nor.
Pine Street Baptist Church v. SIPC, 106 S. Ct. 117 (1986).
289. See supra notes 260-77 and accompanying text.
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will protect REPO participants while assuring that the funds of the
estate, and of SIPA, are not depleted. 2 °
1. Protection of the Market
REPO transactions are as volatile as they are vital. 29 1 According

to the Senate Report to the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984:
[REPO activity] is built upon transactions that are highly interrelated. A collapse of one institution involved in REPO transactions could start a chain reaction, putting at risk hundreds of
billions of dollars, and threatening the solvency of many additional
institutions 292
Congress was concerned with just such a "domino effect" when it
enacted SIPA and dealt with it through the open contract provisions
3

29
of the Act.

SIPA can avert a series of market failures only by treating REPO
transactions as "open contracts.

'294

If a court considers a REPO

transaction a contract for a sale and a subsequent repurchase, SIPA
allows a trustee to complete the REPO to avert a series of market
failures. 291 On the other hand, if a court considers a REPO transaction a loan, the trustee can complete the REPO transaction only
290. See infra notes 321-25 and accompanying text.
291. See 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 99, at 310-12 (statement of Peter D.
Sternlight, Executive Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York); 1983
SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 47.
292. See Volker Letter, supra note 93, at 305 (stating "failure of a major [REPO]
market participant and the ifiability of other parties to liquidate their investment
promptly could ripple outward through the securities market and cause an otherwise
isolated problem to spread to other financial markets"); see also 1983 Senate
Hearings, supra note 99, at 308 (statement of Thomas W. Strauss, Public Securities
Association, "ripple effects ... might seriously paralyze our securities and commodities markets should a large dealer go bankrupt with billions of dollars of
outstanding obligations to investors and dealers, which in turn have billions of
dollars of obligations outstanding to other investors and dealers"); S. REP. No.
65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1983).
293. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 115, at 266-27 (testimony of Phillip
Loomis, General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission); see also SEC v.
Barbour, 421. U.S. 412, 415 (1975) (Congress enacted SIPA to prevent "domino
effect"); Ambassador Church, 679 F.2d at 612 (same).
294. See SEC v. Kelly, Andrews & Bradley, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 948, 952 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); SIPC v. Executive Sec. Corp., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep.
97379 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
295. See 17 C.F.R. § 300.306 (1986). The contracts to be completed need not
conform to the definition of open contract in 17 C.F.R. § 300.300(c) (1986), or
meet the requirements that otherwise dictate when an open contract will be closed
out. See id. §§ 300.306 (1986). However, the SIPC must consult with the SEC
before it makes any determinations under this section. See id.
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if the market value of the underlying securities is greater-than the

repurchase price.296 Such a ruling would leave a SIPA trustee without
the power to prevent a market collapse. Therefore, courts should refuse
to treat REPO transactions as loans and should treat REPOs as con-

tracts for the sale and subsequent repurchaseof securities.
2.

Protecting Customers' Rights to Receive Securities

In 1970, Congress attempted to insulate customers from fluctuations in the market value of securities that were in their account
by requiring SIPA trustees to keep securities in the same form that
they were in at insolvency, and to deliver them to customers.297 In
1979, however, Congress recognized that trustees could not deliver

securities that the insolvent broker had improperly hypothecated,
misappropriated, stolen or never purchased. 29 Accordingly, Congress
bolstered its support for the policy of returning securities to customers
by giving the trustee the authority to purchase "customer securities"
in the open market. 299 This step made the assets in the customer

property fund fungible to a large degree and insured that a SIPA
296. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
297. See Securities Investor Protection Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-283, § 8(b), 92 Stat. 249 § 8(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(b) (1982)); see
also Securities Investor ProtectionAct: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foriegn Commerce,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1978) (because market value of securities due to customers
fluctuates, customers may be unhappy with cash payment based upon value of
their securities at date SIPA proceeding is filed) [hereinafter 1978 House Hearings];
1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 11, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 764, 775 (delivery of securities to make customer accounts whole
is one of essential features of amendments).
298. See 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 764, 765. The Senate report goes on to state:
A principle underlying purpose of the bill is to permit a customer to
receive securities to the maximum extent possible instead of cash, in
satisfaction of a claim for securities. By seeking to make customer accounts
whole and returning them to customers in the form they existed on the
filing date, the amendments not only ...

satisfy the customers' legitimate

expectations, but also would restore the customer to his position prior
to the broker-dealer's financial difficulties. This will enable the customer
to pursue his investment objectives without being disturbed by the forced
sale of securities.
Id.. at 765.
299. See Securities Investor Protection Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.
75-283, § 8(d), 92 Stat. 249 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(d) (1982)); see also 1978
SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 11-12, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 764, 776 (grant of authority to SIPA trustee to purchase securities
supports key objective: satisfying customer claims by delivering securities); 1978 Senate
Hearings, supra note 25, at 9.
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trustee is able to deliver securities, as long as the aggregate value
of the customer property fund remains sufficient to do so."' Therefore, treating a REPO transaction as a sale and subsequent repurchase
will assure that customers receive their securities, as long as that
characterization does not deplete the customer property fund. As
will be discussed presently, that fund will not be depleted when a
court adopts the sale view.3 0'
3.

Increasing the Confidence of the General Public

Congress also attempted to increase the general public's confidence
in the securities industry by creating SIPC. 0 2 If REPO transactions
are considered sales and subsequent repurchases, SIPA will protect
both clients of REPO buyers and clients of REPO issuers. SIPC
was designed to be a well funded insurer, to which all investors could
look with confidence after suffering a loss.3" 3
SIPC advances money to the SIPA trustee without regard to the
ability of the insolvent broker's estate to repay SIPC. 3°4 Therefore,
SIPC funds could be depleted when the SIPA trustee either purchases
securities to restore customer accounts o5 or uses SIPC advances to
reimburse customers for their securities lost. 306 The customer property
fund should contain all the assets necessary to reimbruse SIPC. A
SIPA trustee, however, can use the assets of the insolvent broker to
300. See 1978
CONG.

&

ADMIN.

SENATE REPORT,

supra note 25, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.

CODE

NEWS 764, 765.

301. See infra notes 310-30 and accompanying text.
302. See 1970 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 107, at 5, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5254, 5257; see also 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 159,
at 21 (1977 amendments enhanced investor confidence).

303. See 1970 HousE REPORT, supra note 107, at 5, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
& ADMIN. NEWS, 5254, 5257; 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 213, at 8
(statement of Hon. Hammer Budge, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission); see also SIPC v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 415 (1975) (Congress intended to
restore investor confidence in securities markets); SEC v. Packer Wilbur & Co.
Inc., 498 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1974) (Congress intended to restore confidence
in and strenthen operation of securities market); SEC v. F.O. Baroff & Co., 497
F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1974) (protection provided by SIPC assures investors that
CONG.

stability of marketplace does not become cause of concern).

304. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(b)(1) (1982). But see id. § 78fff-3(a)(5) (1982)
(prohibiting SIPA trustee from using funds advanced by SIPC to reimburse

broker unless that broker can establish it was acting for own customers).
305. See H.R. REP. No. 746, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1977) (committee noted
that phrase "fair and orderly market" was included in SIPA to assure that SIPC
funds need not be expended if price of security needed to restore customer account
is too high).
306. See 1978 House Hearings, supra note 297, at 70-71 (Hugh Owens, Chairman,
SIPC, advocates raising amount of protection available to each individual customer
and addresses concern that raising protection may deplete SIPC funds).
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restore securities to the customer property fund when a broker failed
to hold its customer's securities.3" 7 A SIPA trustee can then use the
customer property fund to reimburse SIPC for advances."0 Therefore,
SIPC funds are at risk only to the extent that the insolvent broker's
estate plus the customer property fund is insufficent to restore cash
and securities to customers' accounts.
B.

The Customer Property Fund

Treating a REPO transaction as a contract for a sale and a
subsequent repurchase will not deplete the customer property fund
unless a court also deems a REPO participant a SIPA customer.
Absent fraud a°9 or negligence,3t0 parties would not enter into a REPO
transaction unless doing so was commercially reasonable. 1 Each
party receives a benefit from the bargain,31 2 and, upon insolvency,
that benefit accrues to the customer property fund whether or not
the parties breach the REPO agreement."'

307. See 15 U.S.C. § 78111(4)(a) (1982).
308. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(1)(C) (1982). The disbursements from the customer

property fund are made according to 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c) (1982). SIPC is
reimbursed both as the subrogee to the claims of customers, see id. § 78 fff-2(c)
(1982), and for advances used to secure any debt under sections 78fff-2(f) and
78fff-3(c)(2). See id. § 78fff-2(c)(2) to (c)(3) (1982).
309. A SIPA trustee can void fraudulent transactions, see 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982),
and recover the property involved. See id. § 550(a) (1982). In addition, any property
of the debtor which customers would receive as compensatory damages in a Rule
lob-5 securities fraud lawsuit is included in customer property. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78111(4)(D) (1982); see supra note 147 and accompanying text. Defrauded buyers
receive their purchase price if they opt to rescind the contract, see 4 A. BROMBERG,
SECURITiEs FRAUD AND COMMODITIEs FRAUD § 9.1, at 226 n.2 (1984), or they may
recover for out-of-pocket loss if they decide to sue under the contract for the
breach. See id. at 226 n.3. In contrast, sellers can force a buyer to disgorge any
profits made using a constructive trust theory. See id. at 227 n.8; see also infra
notes 327-28 and accompanying text (discussing SIPA trustee's power to bring action against insolvent broker's officers for fraud).
310. Customer property is increased both by the property of the debtor that
would be awarded to customers in a common law action of negligence, see 15
U.S.C. § 78111(4)(D) (1982), and by securities that according to the net capital
requirement, see id. § 78o(c)(3) (1982), the debtor should have possessed or controlled.
See id. § 78111(4)(A) (1982).
311. The courts have recognized the concept of "commercially reasonable" actions
in the sale of collateral under the U.C.C. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1978). A sale
of collateral is commercially reasonable if the party acts in good faith, avoids loss,
and makes an effective realization of the debt. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose
Indus. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 698, 715 (C.D. Pa.), aff'd, 398 F.2d 310 (3d Cir.
1968); see also United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247, 259 (6th Cir. 1979).
312. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
313. See infra notes 314-20 and accompanying text.
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A REPO issuer transfers his customer's securities in return for
cash to use for a certain period of time.3 '1 4 If a REPO issuer files
for insolvency under SIPA, the value of the securities is protected.
If the REPO contract is completed, the proceeds of investments the
REPO issuer makes with the cash provided in the REPO, plus the
collateral securities themselves, are included in the REPO issuer's
customer property fund.3 1 Alternatively, if the REPO buyer breaches
the contract, the REPO issuer could retain the cash and bring a breach

of contract action for the REPO buyer's failure to deliver securities."',
The trustee can then add any damages recovered to the customer property fund.3 17

Similarly, a REPO buyer can use its customers' cash to fund a
REPO transaction. When the REPO is completed, that cash is

returned with interest.318 If the REPO buyer becomes insolvent, both
the principal and the interest become customer property; 19 and if
the REPO issuer fails to repurchase, the REPO buyer's trustee can
foreclose, sell the underlying securities and bring a breach of contract
action to recover any shortfall.22
In contrast, if a REPO participant is considered a customer in
his own right, the SIPC fund will be depleted. SIPA protects customers by returning securities and cash. 2 1 Under the sale view, a
REPO buyer does not buy a security, he obligates himself to return
314. See SEC v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 295, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
see also SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (government securities
dealers use cash provided by REPOs to finance their holdings); Executive Sec.
Corp., 423 F. Supp. at 98 (benefit of REPO-like loan of securities is in investing
money acquired); STIGUM, supra note 56, at 416-18.
315. See 15 U.S.C. § 78111(4) (1982). SIPA's definition of customer property
includes "securities ... at any time received, acquired or held by or for the account

of a debtor from or for the securities account of a customer, and the proceeds
of any such property transferred by the debtor, including property unlawfully
converted." See id. (emphasis added).
316. See supra notes 201-04.
317. See 15 U.S.C. § 78111(4) (1982). Customer property includes the proceeds
of securities held for customers but unlawfully converted. See id.; see also supra
note 197 (estate includes value of contractual right of recovery).
318. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
319. See 15 U.S.C. § 78111(4) (1982). SIPA's definition of customer property
includes both "resources provided through the use or realization of customers'
debit cash balances ... [,]" 15 U.S.C. § 78111(4)(B) (1982), "cash ... held by or

for the account of a debtor from or for the securities account of a customer."
15 U.S.C. § 78111(4) (1982)."
320. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
321. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(a)(1)(B) (1982); 1978 Senate Hearing, supra note 25,
at 4 (statement of Harold M. Williams, Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission); 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmiN. NEws 674, 675.

FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. XV

a security on the repurchase date.3 22 This obligation means that a
REPO buyer can retransfer the underlying securities as long as he
satisfies his obligation to return securities in the future.3 23 This type
24
of retransfer is a common practice in the REPO market.
For example, if broker A issued a REPO to broker B, broker B
could retransfer the securities to broker C. If broker B becomes
insolvent between the sale and the repurchase, broker A would have
a customer property claim for the underlying securities and broker
C would have a customer property claim for the repurchase price.
In such a situation, broker A could claim securities that broker B
was not obligated to hold. This example illustrates that when a court
treats a REPO participant as a SIPA customer, the customer property
fund of the insolvent broker, and therefore the funds of SIPC,32 5
will be depleted.
Therefore, absent fraud or negligence, unless a REPO participant
is considered a customer, the assets in the customer property fund
are not diminished by considering a REPO transaction as a contract
for a sale and a subsequent repurchase. The customer property fund
can be diminished, however, if the bankrupt broker had improperly
used REPOs to generate cash or securities to cover bad proprietary
investments. 2 6 A SIPA trustee can bring legal actions against former
officers of the bankrupt who were responsible for such fraudulent

322. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 87.
324. See Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 471-72; Oversight of Government Securities,
supra note 21, at 87,397 n.14; see also 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 99, at

323 (statement of Peter J. Sternlight, Executive Vice President, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York).
325. The SIPA trustee uses SIPC funds to reimburse customers for securities
that are missing from the customer property fund. See supra notes 191-92 and
accompanying text.
326. In SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the court discussed
various ways in which securities provided by REPOs are invested:
[R]epos are a very convenient way to leverage capital in order to take
large positions in a security. And it is easy to see how a repo can be
used to borrow against either a long or short position. Simply stated,
"long" means taking the risks of owning, while "short" means taking
the risks of owing. When a dealer wants to leverage long, he can buy
a large amount of a security and finance nearly all of its purchase price
by immediately "hanging it out" on repo-in other words, by borrowing
the money and using the securities as collateral. Using repos to leverage
short is slightly more complicated. The dealer sells securities he does not
own, then lends the proceeds of the sale in a repo, receiving as collateral
the same type of securities he has sold. He then delivers the collateral
to the initial purchaser to complete the transaction.
Id. at 471-72 (footnotes omitted).
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schemes3 27 and then add any damages recovered to the customer property fund.128 It is unreasonable to assume, however, that the trustee
would be able to recover anything greater than a small portion of
the money lost. It is entirely consistent with the purposes of SIPA
to subject SIPC funds to that type of risk. Congress recognized that
SIPC funds would be depleted when a broker misused assets acquired
with a customer's cash or securities,329 but Congress nonetheless chose
to indemnify customers.3 3 Consequently, treating REPO transactions

327. The property of the estate in bankruptcy includes any right of action the
bankrupt corporation may have against its officers or directors for misconduct,
mismanagement or negligence. See In re Burnett-Clark, Ltd., 56 F.2d 744 (2d Cir.
1932); In re Swofford Bros. Dry Goods Co., 180 F. 549 (W.D. Mo. 1910); 4
COLLIER, supra note 4,
541.10. Thus, a bankruptcy trustee can prosecute a fraud
claim against the former officers or directors of the bankrupt. 4 COLLIER, supra
note 4,
541.10; In re Plants & Faculties Co., 441 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1971);
Bayliss v. Rood, 424 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1970)
SIPA gives its trustees the same powers and duties as a bankruptcy trustee. See
15 U.S.C. § 78fff-l(a). Therefore, it appears that a SIPA trustee can prosecute
an action for fraud against the bankrupt's former officers. See, e.g., Bondy v.
Chemical Bank, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,360
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
328. A SIPA trustee can add any money so recovered to the estate of the debtor.
See In re Burnett-Clark, Ltd., 56 F.2d 744 (2d Cir. 1932); In re Swofford
Bros. Dry Goods Co., 180 F. 549 (W.D. Mo. 1910); 4 COLLIER supra note 4,
541.10. All property of the estate in bankruptcy can be added to the "customer
property" fund to the extent that the insufficiency of the fund is attributable to
non-compliance with 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3). 15 U.S.C. §'78111(4) (1982).
329. See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 25, at 4. In 1977, SIPC Chairman
Owens brought problems with SIPA to Congress' attention:
[C]ustomers generally expect to receive what is in their accounts when
the member stops doing business. But in many instances that has not
* always been possible because securities have been lost, improperly hypothecated, misappropriated, never purchased, or even stolen, When
there are valid claims for more stock than is on hand, under the present

statute the claimant will receive only a pro rata portion of the securities
he claims.

Id.
Congress responded by providing protection for such losses. See Securities Investor
Protection Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-283, 92 Stat. 249. Similarly,
Congress broadened the class of stockbrokers to which SIPA applies. SIPA originally
covered only organizations that maintained customer accounts, but was changed
to include all firms that handled "customer securities" when the possibility of loss
or misappropriation exists. See Securities Investor Protection: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 72-73 (1977) (statement of Hugh F. Owens,

Chairman, SIPC).
330. The House Committee stated that a major aim of SIPA was to "establish
immediately a substantial reserve fund which [would] provide protection to customers
of broker-dealers . . . . " H.R. REP. No. 1613, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5254, 5257

(1970).
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as contracts for a sale and a subsequent repurchase is consistent with
Congress' mandate.
VII.

Conclusion

A court should not allow a SIPA trustee to classify a REPO
transaction as a loan arrangement in order to assert his statutory
powers, and then refuse to protect the owners of securities underlying
those same REPO transactions as "customers." A court should treat
a repurchase agreement as a contract for a sale and a subsequent
repurchase. This classification will allow REPO participants to liquidate the collateral securities, if doing so would be economically
advantageous and would deplete neither the "customer property"
fund nor the assets of SIPC. In addition, characterizing a REPO
transaction as a contract for a sale and a subsequent repurchase
will enable SIPC to prevent a series of market failures by closing
out open REPO contracts. Therefore, the sale characterization will
insure market stability, customer protection and maximum economic
gain.
Michael D. Bolton

